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In the Organization’s Shadow: How Individual
Behavior Is Shaped by Organizational
Leakage1
Matthew E. Brashears
University of South Carolina
Michael Genkin
Singapore Management University
Chan S. Suh
Boise State University
Individuals who join an organization often adopt its characteristic be-
haviors, but does the same effect extend to nearby nonmembers, and
is this process impeded or enhanced by the competition between orga-
nizations? This article argues that organizations inﬂuence the behav-
ior of bothmembers and proximate nonmembers in a process we term
“organizational leakage” and that competition between organizations
moderates the impact of any one of them on individual behavior. This
article ﬁnds, using the Add Health data, that an individual’s location
in an organizational ecology is an important predictor of his or her be-
havior, evenwhile controlling for other factors, includingmembership.
Organizations, and organizational competition, affect individual behavior.
Organizations are unique social entities that exhibit behaviors (Argote and
Greve 2007; Gavetti, Levinthal, and Ocasio 2007), possess identities (Albert
and Whetten 1985; Gioia et al. 2010), and exert a powerful normative in-
1 Preliminary versions of this article were presented at Sunbelt XXXII and at the annual
meeting of the American Sociological Association inDenver, Colorado. The authors thank
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ﬂuence over their members (Alexander, Zucker, and Brody 1970; Zucker
1977). Organizations are also embedded in environments (see Scott 2004)
and are inﬂuenced both by events taking place in other organizations (Davis
1991; Strang andSoule 1998) andby the knowledge of new recruits (DiMaggio
and Powell 1983). Finally, organizations are in competition with each other,
both for members (McPherson 1983; McPherson and Ranger-Moore 1991)
and for customers (Hannan andFreeman 1989). Thus, organizations directly
affect the behaviors of both individualmembers and other organizations. But
can organizations also inﬂuence socially proximate nonmembers, and is the
organizational inﬂuence on individual behaviors moderated by competition
between organizations?
We argue that the answer to both of these questions is yes. Organizational
boundaries are porous, which allows new behaviors to enter the organiza-
tion from the outside, while also permitting behaviors to leak out of the or-
ganization into the local social environment. Proximity to an organization
in social space should thus make these leaking behaviors more available
and attractive to individuals who are not members of that organization,
as long as both are part of the same local context. Moreover, organizations
compete with each other for members, for resources, and for clients; and
when individuals are exposed to the behaviors of many different organiza-
tions (i.e., high organizational competition), the inﬂuence of any one organi-
zation will be diminished. As a result, the behaviors of individuals can be
fully understood only when placed in the context of organizations and the
competition between them.
We begin by describing previous research on organizations, their effects
on individual behavior, and their interactionswith their environment. Orga-
nizations have a uniquely powerful ability to generate and maintain norms,
thereby inﬂuencing member behavior. We then introduce McPherson’s
(1983) afﬁliational ecology or “Blau space” model and extend it by linking
organizational competition to individual-level behavior. Blau space allows
us tomodel ecological forces and to capture “casual contact,” or interpersonal
King, Ben Cornwell, Brian Rubineau, Beth Duckles, Laura Aufderheide Brashears,
Yongren Shi, Nicholas Harrigan, Jordan Raddick, and Yisook Lim for their helpful sug-
gestions. All remaining errors are strictly the responsibility of the authors. This research
was supported by a grant from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (HDTRA-10-1-
0043). This research uses data from Add Health, a program project directed by Kathleen
Mullan Harris and designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and KathleenMullan
Harris at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and funded by grant P01-
HD31921 from the NICHD, with cooperative funding from 23 other federal agencies
and foundations. This research also uses data from the Adolescent Health and Academic
Achievement study, which was funded by a grant (R01 HD040428-02) from the NICHD
and a grant (REC-0126167) from the National Science Foundation. For more informa-
tion, see http://www.laits.utexas.edu/ahaa. Direct all correspondence to Matthew E.
Brashears, Sloan College, University of South Carolina, Room 321, 911 Pickens Street,
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contacts that are impractical or impossible to measure with conventional so-
cial network instruments. We argue that individuals are more likely to ex-
hibit behaviors that are common in a cohesive organization that competes
for their time, regardless of whether they are members of that organization.
We further argue that the strength of this effect is moderated by the degree
of competition the individual experiences: when one is being competed over
by several organizations, the degree of inﬂuence that any one organization
exerts over individual behavior is reduced. We then introduce ﬁve scope
conditions that limit the applicability of our argument. In brief, our argu-
ment applies to organizations that are structurally cohesive and to behav-
iors that enjoy normative consensus in their host organizations, that can be
observed in nonorganizational contexts, and that are potentially usable to
those outside the organization. Additionally, we argue that organizational
competition moderates these effects only when the organizations are com-
peting over the same individuals. Finally, we demonstrate the utility of our
model by using the Add Health data to predict individual behaviors (both
conventional and delinquent) within a set of 81 independent organizational
ecologies identiﬁed using extracurricular activity membership. The results
are consistent with our hypotheses and suggest important avenues for fu-
ture research on organizations, norms, and social contagions.
BACKGROUND AND THEORY
Individual Behavior, Organizations, and the Environment
Organizations are distinctive social entities (e.g., Perrow 1979, 2002; Cole-
man 1982, 1990), which can be viewed as “a particular kind of social actor,
capable of behaving in a purposeful, intentional manner” (King, Felin, and
Whetten 2010, p. 291). Organizations exhibit behavior (Argote andGreve 2007;
Gavetti et al. 2007), possess identities (Albert and Whetten 1985; Gioia et al.
2010), and enact their own scripts (Gioia and Poole 1984). Moreover, organiza-
tions are often viewed as actors by individuals (e.g., Scott andMeyer 1994) and
possess their own unique cultures (Ouchi and Wilkins 1985).
In addition to having attitudes and behaviors at the organizational level,
themembers of an organization frequently possess characteristic patterns of
attitudes and behaviors. Organizations tend to foster social identities (Tajfel
1982; Ashforth andMael 1989; Ellemers, Spears, andDoosje 2002), and these
identities are often associatedwith speciﬁc behaviors (e.g., Ashforth andMael
1989; Eccles andBarber 1999;Barber, Eccles, andStone 2001).Manybehav-
iors, though not all, are characteristic of particular organizations or organi-
zational identities, and organizations of the same type (i.e., members of an
“organizational ﬁeld”; see DiMaggio and Powell 1983) often host similar
individual behaviors. These characteristic behaviors can become norms
(Friedkin 2001), which often (but not invariably; see Feldman 1984; Kitts
Organizational Leakage
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2006) support the objectives of the organization. The development of norms
depends on perceptions of the situation (Alexander et al. 1970): persons who
identify themselves as members of an organization transmit group norms to
new members more quickly, maintain the norms more reliably, and resist
the encroachment of rival norms more effectively than others (Zucker 1977).
These norms are legitimated, and thereby entrenched, by both formal and
informal authorization from superordinate individuals aswell as by implicit
or explicit endorsement from peers (Suchman 1995; Johnson, Dowd, and
Ridgeway 2006). As a consequence, organizations are uniquely effective
at transmitting and maintaining norms, and organizational culture is quite
stable (Harrison and Carroll 2002).
While organizational culture is resistant to change, organizations are not
static entities. Rather, they are embedded in environments and their bound-
aries are porous to outside inﬂuences (see Scott 2004). The diffusion of ideas
and behaviors between organizations can occur via several mechanisms
(Strang and Soule 1998) and has been used to explain a wide variety of spe-
ciﬁc outcomes (e.g., Holden 1986; Davis 1991; Conell and Cohn 1995), as
well as organizational isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) more gen-
erally. Organizations also serve as foci around which social network ties
form (Feld 1981), and these networks allow organization leaders to monitor
the environment (Useem 1984) and inﬂuence organizational proﬁtability
and success (Uzzi 1997; Ingram and Roberts 2000).
Just as porous boundaries permit behaviors to enter the organization,
they also allow organizational behaviors and attitudes to exit into the en-
vironment by altering the actions of members across a variety of settings
(see Rotchford and Roberts 1982). Kohn and Schooler (1978) use longitudi-
nal data to ﬁnd that job complexity leads to greater intellectual ﬂexibility
in nonjob tasks and that job characteristics inﬂuence current intellectual
and personality traits expressed in nonemployment situations (Kohn and
Schooler 1982). Similarly, Hanks (1981) ﬁnds that participation in volun-
tary organizations in adolescence leads to heightened political activity in
early adulthood. McFarland and Thomas (2006) ﬁnd that adolescent in-
volvement in politically salient voluntary organizations (e.g., debate team,
French club) predicts political activity in adulthood, while involvement in
other types of voluntary organizations (e.g., cheerleading) does not (see also
Wilson andMusick 1999). Adolescent involvement in extracurricular clubs
has been shown to shape identities (Ashforth andMael 1989; Hornsey 2008)
as well as current and future educational, occupational, and substance use
outcomes (Eccles and Barber 1999; Barber et al. 2001). Research using an
adult population (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995) ﬁnds that involve-
ment in organizations that promote “civic skills,” such as public speaking,
leads to greater levels of political activity. Thus, both for-proﬁt and volun-
tary organizations are able to affect the behaviors of their current and for-
American Journal of Sociology
790
mer members outside of organizational settings. Moreover, this appears to
be a function of the organization’s characteristics (e.g., job complexity, po-
litical salience) rather than solely a result of involvement in an organization,
regardless of its characteristics or norms.
The existing research on organizations and individual-level behavior is
substantial, but it can be extended in at least two respects: by examining
the effects of organizations on nonmembers and by attending to the simul-
taneous impact of multiple organizations on individuals. First, research has
focused on how organizations affect member behaviors, both inside and
outside of the organization, but the porous boundaries that allow practices
to enter an organization can also permit the practices and norms (i.e., cul-
ture) of an organization to leak out into the surrounding social network.
Members do not cease exhibiting organization-typical behaviors whenever
they are outside of the organization; instead they carry these behaviors into
recreational, familial, and other settings. Mere exposure to a behavior is of-
ten sufﬁcient to produce positive attitudes toward it (e.g., Zajonc 1968;
Saegert, Swap, and Zajonc 1973; Brockner and Swap 1976; Swap 1977;
Moreland and Zajonc 1982), making adoption of organizational behaviors
by nonmembers more likely. Organizations have a powerful ability to de-
velop and maintain norms (Zucker 1977), and many of these norms will
have been legitimated within the organization. The adherence of organiza-
tion members to these norms and their corresponding behaviors outside of
organizational contexts implicitly endorses these behaviors to nonmembers
(Walker, Thomas, and Zelditch 1986). This endorsement encourages non-
members to view these behaviors as valid (i.e., socially appropriate), leading
to feelings of propriety (i.e., that a behavior is appropriate for oneself ), and
further encourages behavioral adoption (Walker and Zelditch 1993; Zel-
ditch and Walker 2003). The organization therefore legitimates and stabi-
lizes the behaviors of members and then, through members, exerts a con-
sistent inﬂuence over nonmember behavior. While nonmembers certainly
exert inﬂuence on members in return, this inﬂuence is not consistent across
all nonmembers and lacks the legitimacy and stabilization provided by an
organization. As a result, behaviors will tend to spread more readily from
members to the nonmember population than the reverse. Exposure to or-
ganizational behaviors can occur via direct association, such as when an
organization member has an ongoing relationship (e.g., friends, romantic
partners) with a nonmember, but this is not the only vector. There is also ca-
sual contactwherein nonmemberswho share the same settingswithmembers
(e.g., eating in the same restaurant, waiting at the same bus stop) are exposed
to the behaviors ofmemberswithout an ongoing relationship. Casual contact
allows nonmembers to observe and adopt many behaviors in the absence of
an ongoing relationshipwith an organizational member.Moreover, the num-
ber of peoplewho are in casual contactwith organizationmembers is likely to
Organizational Leakage
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greatly exceed the total number who have ongoing relationships with mem-
bers, thereby magnifying the scope of organizational inﬂuence. Some re-
search (e.g., Giordano 2003; Crosnoe et al. 2008; Frank et al. 2008; Frank,
Muller, and Mueller 2013; Sun et al. 2013) has already begun to uncover
the importance of casual contact. Unfortunately, these efforts are limited,
both in their ability to speak to a variety of types of casual contact and in their
reliance on data that are rarely available (discussed more fully below). As
such, there is considerable room for additional work on casual contact. Fi-
nally, nonmemberswho are indirectly connected tomembers via short chains
of intermediaries (e.g., if a member is a “friend of a friend”) are more likely
to hear about and adopt organization-typical behaviors secondhand. In all
of these cases, socially proximate nonmembers will have greater exposure
to, and an increased likelihood of adopting, organization-typical behaviors.
In contrast, when a nonmember has few or no associates who are members,
has infrequent or no casual contact with members, and is connected to mem-
bers only via long chains of intermediaries, he will have lower exposure to,
and a decreased likelihood of adopting, organization-typical behaviors. Thus,
in a process that we term “organizational leakage,” both members and non-
members are more likely to engage in organization-typical behaviors when
the organization is part of the local social context (discussedmore extensively
below).2 If organizations affect the behavior of socially proximate nonmem-
bers (i.e., if organizational leakage occurs), then efforts to predict individual
behaviors must take organizational inﬂuences into account.3
Second, research on how organizations affect member behavior has typ-
ically focused on one organization at a time, but the world contains multiple
organizations and individuals are likely to be exposed to leakage from sev-
eral organizations simultaneously. Since individuals have limited time and
attention to devote to behaviors, persons who are exposed to multiple orga-
nizations are unlikely to be able to fully adopt the characteristic (i.e., norma-
tive) behaviors of all of those organizations. Moreover, the presence of mul-
tiple organizations will produce conﬂicting endorsements, greatly weakening
the ability of any one organization’s behaviors to be legitimated. Thus, when
individuals are exposed to leakage from several organizations, the relative in-
2 Organizational leakage is similar to, but more general than, the “religious network spill-
over” hypothesis (e.g., Borgonovi 2008), which argues in part that higher religiosity in an
area (e.g., a county or country) changes the behavior of religious and nonreligious indi-
viduals (Kelley and De Graaf 1997; Ruiter and De Graaf 2006; Lim and MacGregor
2012; but see also Ruiter and De Graaf 2010; Van der Meer, Te Grotenhuis, and Pelzer
2010).We agree that group behaviors can spread to nonmembers, but we view leakage as
a property of organizations generally rather than of religious organizations speciﬁcally.
3 This expectation is consistent with existing models of norm formation and equilibrium
in social networks that explicitly include exogenous effects (e.g., Friedkin and Johnsen
1997; Friedkin 2001).
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ﬂuence that any one organization exerts will be reduced, even if the organi-
zations and individuals are unaware that competition exists.4 Understanding
individual behavior thus requires attention not just to organizations but to
the competitive ecology of organizations.
To evaluate these ideas we need amethod that can capture organizational
leakage while simultaneously accounting for the effect of competition. This
is especially difﬁcult because organizational leakage can occur via casual
contact, which is difﬁcult to measure in a precise manner. These require-
ments are met with the assistance of the next element of our theoretical
structure: Blau space.
Blau Space and the Ecology of Afﬁliation
We use Blau space to capture the social proximity of individuals and orga-
nizations, to measure casual contact between individuals, and to model the
competitive ecology of those organizations. Blau space, named in honor of
Peter M. Blau, is a k-dimensional system in which each dimension is a so-
ciodemographic parameter and each point is represented by a set of k coor-
dinates (McPherson 1983;McPherson andRanger-Moore 1991). Each set of
coordinates represents a unique combination of sociodemographic charac-
teristics, and both individuals and organizations can be represented in Blau
space at coordinates that correspond to these combinations. Blau space can
be used as a probabilistic description of social networks when network data
are either unavailable or incomplete and allows us tomodel social processes
by focusing on multidimensional propinquity rather than the linear effects
of individual variables.
Blau space can serve as a probabilistic description of social networks be-
cause of the prevalence of homophily (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954), or the
tendency for individuals to associate with those who are similar to them-
selves (e.g., “birds of a feather ﬂock together”). Homophily is one of the most
robust of all social science ﬁndings (e.g., McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and
Cook 2001; Smith, McPherson, and Smith-Lovin 2014) and plays a signif-
icant role in determining association in both the United States (Marsden
1987, 1988; Smith et al. 2014) and elsewhere (Brashears 2008b). As a conse-
quence of homophily, nearness in a Blau spacemodel is positively related to
the likelihood of association across many types of relations, meaning that
our social worlds tend to encompass only small, local regions of Blau space
4 Competition between organizations should reduce organizational leakage of all types
but will most strongly affect behavior. Because behaviors are costly in terms of time, in-
dividuals cannot adopt new behaviors without limit. Attitudes, on the other hand, im-
pose relatively lower costs in time and are affected primarily by competition for attention.
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(i.e., individual networks tend to be populated by those who are nearby in a
Blau space model).5
Blau space is also a useful approach to modeling organizations such as
religious groups, recreational clubs, businesses, and professional organiza-
tions.6 Organizations exist for a variety of purposes and require a variety of
resources, but they all require members, and this need contributes to a Blau
space model in two important ways. First, organizations recruit new mem-
bers primarily from among the associates of their existing members; one is
more likely to join an organization that already includes people who are
known. This is true even in for-proﬁt organizations; informal recruiting
via networks is the most common mode of recruitment in the labor market
and is responsible for approximately half of all hires (Granovetter 1995;
Bewley 1999;Marsden andGorman 2001). However, the networks ofmem-
bers are constrained by homophily at the individual level and thus connect
to others who are nearby in Blau space.7 As a result, organizations are local-
ized to particular areas of a Blau space model, known as niches, and most
organization members are drawn from within these niches.
Second, both the amount of time that any one person can devote to his
memberships and the number of persons available in any given segment
of a population (i.e., area in a Blau space model) are limited. As a conse-
quence, organizations whose niches overlap are competing over the same
limited pool of resources (i.e., member time and attention). The larger the
number of organizations that attempt to drawmembers from the same area
in a Blau space model (i.e., the same population segment), the more compe-
tition these organizations experience. Thus, Blau space permits us to con-
struct an ecological model of organizational membership, and the changing
demographics of organizations can be predicted—at least in part—through
a Darwinian process of recruitment and retention.8 Moreover, and in con-
trast to some other approaches (e.g., Ku, Malhotra, and Murninghan
2005; Kilduff, Elfenbein, and Staw 2010), it is not necessary that organiza-
5 Blau space is not real in a physical sense, but is simply a useful model, and care should
be taken to avoid reifying Blau space.
6 Blau space has usually been used to analyze “voluntary associations,” but as is clear in
McPherson’s original (1983) treatment, the theory applies to all social organizations. Vol-
untary associations are simply a useful test case for this more general theory.
7 Weak ties (Granovetter 1995) are often less constrained by homophily than strong ties,
but stronger ties provide larger amounts (Aral and Van Alstyne 2011) of better-tailored
(Marin 2012) information and thus are often more important to recruitment events. Nev-
ertheless, both types of ties depend on foci (Feld 1981) and therefore tend to be homo-
philous on characteristics associated with that focus.
8 This model is similar to population ecology models (e.g., Hannan and Freeman 1989)
because both analogize to biological ecology. Blau space emphasizes competition for
members, whereas population ecology focuses on competition for customers. See also
Hannan, Carroll, and Polos (2003).
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tions be aware that they are competing. As long as two organizations are
exploiting the same ﬁnite pool of resources, they are in competition and will
affect one another’s fortunes.
The degree of competition in a region of a Blau space has predictable ef-
fects on organizational memberships. In areas of high competition, current
members are more likely to leave the organization (Popielarz and McPher-
son 1995; McPherson and Rotolo 1996), drawn off by connections to others
in competing groups. Likewise, recruitment efforts will be less successful as
rival organizations pursue the same individuals. In contrast, areas of rela-
tively low competitionwill producemore successful recruitment and less at-
trition. Over time the niches of organizations drift away from areas of high
competition (i.e., population segments that are being recruited by many or-
ganizations) and toward areas of low competition (i.e., population segments
that are being recruited by few, or no, organizations), eventually reaching
equilibrium where the available resources have been divided between the
competing organizations.9 However, periodic changes in the quantity of po-
tential members (i.e., the carrying capacity of the system)will generate shifts
in the positions of organization niches (McPherson and Ranger-Moore
1991) and prevent a static equilibrium. Organizations rely on individuals
for their survival, and changes in the number and location of individuals
in Blau space will produce changes in the location of organizational niches.
The Blau space model was constructed to explain the membership char-
acteristics of organizations but has been used to explain individual familiar-
ity with, and fondness for, cultural products (Mark 2003), such as musical
styles (Mark 1998; Bonikowski 2010). In other words, cultural products,
such as musical styles, can be modeled as competing for fans in much the
sameway that organizations compete formembers, and in theory awide va-
riety of phenomena can be modeled in similar fashion (McPherson 2004).
Despite its broad theoretical potential, the Blau spacemodel has been pri-
marily used to explain why individuals join certain groups or adopt certain
types of music, both of which can be viewed as memberships of one sort or
another. It has not been used to detect the leakage of organizational norms
and behaviors into the networks that surround the organization or to proxy
for casual contact, and we use it for these purposes.
Organizational Leakage, Context Effects, and Casual Contact
As described above, organizational leakage is a process by which individu-
als who are regularly exposed to organizational culture in their environment
become more likely to exhibit organization-typical behaviors. Organiza-
9 Organizations may also be able to develop symbiotic relationships, but this is beyond
the scope of this article. See Shi et al. (2017) for an investigation of these issues.
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tional leakage can thus be viewed as a type of context effect; nonmembers
are likely to engage in the behaviors common in organizations that share
their context. Context effects have a long history in social science (see Bla-
lock 1984; Abbott 1997) but have often been criticized for assuming a form
of “social telepathy” (Erbring and Young 1979). In other words, there must
be a mechanism that allows the context to inﬂuence the individual. Social
networks are a particularly valuable approach to solving this problem. In
this method, inﬂuence is thought to move through ongoing interpersonal
relationships, and thus measuring these relationships (i.e., network ties)
permits one to understand how a context affects individual behavior (e.g.,
Marsden and Friedkin 1993; Kirke 2004; Centola 2010; Mercken et al.
2010; Friedkin and Johnsen 2011; Bond et al. 2012). This solves the social
telepathy problem, but there are several difﬁculties that limit the utility of
this approach. First, network data are notoriously time intensive to collect
(e.g., McCarty, Killworth, and Rennell 2007), and the average person main-
tains networks of a few hundred (McCarty et al. 2001; Roberts et al. 2008;
DiPrete et al. 2011) to nearly two thousand (Killworth et al. 1990) others. As
a result, it is impractical or impossible to accurately measure all of the rela-
tionships throughwhich inﬂuence can ﬂow. This problem is exacerbated by
the need to collect data from all members of the study population in order to
correctly estimate inﬂuence effects (Lewis, Gonzalez, and Kaufman 2012).
Second, while network methods are appropriate for measuring ongoing re-
lationships, they aremuch less likely to capture the impact of casual contact.
Whenwe observe others engaging in behavior, it makes that behavior more
cognitively accessible for us (i.e., it comes to mind more readily) and makes
it appear more acceptable (i.e., endorses the behavior), even when those
others are not people with whomwe have a relationship. For example, chil-
dren who observe people smoking inmovies are more likely to smoke them-
selves, even though they do not know the smokers personally (Dalton et al.
2003; Sargent 2005), and mere exposure has long been known to positively
inﬂuence attitudes toward behaviors (Zajonc 1968; Saegert et al. 1973;
Brockner and Swap 1976; Swap 1977; Moreland and Zajonc 1982). While
network measures can capture inﬂuence conveyed by stable, ongoing rela-
tionships, they cannot detect the effects of casual contact. Given that in a
day we typically observe the behaviors of many others with whomwe have
no ongoing relationships, casual contact represents an important channel of
inﬂuence. Casual contact has already received some limited attention, al-
though much work remains to be done. Sun et al. (2013) found that adults
tend to encounter the same strangers (i.e., casual contacts) on a predictable
basis. Giordano (2003) showed that many types of relationships inﬂuence
adolescents, including family members, direct associates, romantic part-
ners, and, crucially, unconnected but salient others most often referred to
as “crowds” (see also Brown, Eicher, and Petrie 1986; Eder and Parker
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1987).While the impact of crowds on individuals is often viewed as an iden-
tity effect and does not require association between members of a crowd,
this work nevertheless suggests channels of inﬂuence other than the inter-
personal ties measured by network analysis (see also Frank 2009). An excel-
lent stream of research, utilizing adolescents, has identiﬁed the importance
of “local positions” (Field et al. 2006; Frank et al. 2008), or recurring pat-
terns of copresence in foci (Feld 1981). In the school context, each course se-
lected by an adolescent constrains the other courses that can ﬁt in his or her
schedule. Therefore, adolescents tend to sort themselves into particular con-
ﬁgurations of courses where they encounter the same set of others across
multiple classes. Adolescents who are part of one such conﬁguration of
classes share a “local position,” and local positions have been found to inﬂu-
ence academic performance (Crosnoe et al. 2008; Frank et al. 2008) and net-
work composition (Frank et al. 2013). While of high quality, this research
relies on data that are often unavailable and captures only a narrow, but
detailed, slice of an individual’s casual contacts. For example, Sun et al.
(2013) relied on electronic records of public transit access in Singaporewhile
the literature on local positions has relied on adolescent course rosters. Both
types of data provide excellent detail about the copresence of speciﬁc indi-
viduals but are often difﬁcult to obtain as they can raise concerns about in-
vasion of privacy.10 Moreover, even when these data are available, they can
capture casual contacts occurring only via those speciﬁc contexts (e.g., pub-
lic transport or course schedule) and are unable to speak to casual contacts
occurring in other venues.
Third, research suggests that individuals are sometimes most likely to
adopt the behaviors of individuals to whom they are not directly connected,
instead responding to the actions of disconnected, but structurally similar,
others (e.g., Burt 1980). This effect implies that the mutual awareness and
monitoring common to any social situation may act as a conduit for context
effects even in the absence of ongoing relationships (e.g., friendship ties).11
As a result, while studies have used networks to identify inﬂuence (e.g.,
Coleman, Katz, and Menzel 1966; Christakis and Fowler 2007), they have
often been challenged for assuming that themeasured networks are the only,
or primary, channels through which inﬂuence occurs (Van den Bulte and
Lilien 2001; Cohen-Cole and Fletcher 2008a, 2008b).
Finally, while social networks provide a clear channel for inﬂuence that is
frequently absent from context effects, the reason why contact with speciﬁc
10 We do not mean to imply any judgment about the ethics of this research, but only to
note that access to these types of data is sometimes tightly constrained by human subjects
panels.
11 Conventional network methods are capable of measuring structural equivalence, but
identifying equivalences is not the same as explaining how such individuals are able to
inﬂuence one another.
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others encourages adoption of their behavior is left unspeciﬁed. Adoption
could result from simple contagion, as in meme theory (Dawkins [1976]
2006), from a need to conform in order to achieve group approval (Hogg
and Terry 2000), from the objective utility of the behavior (Rogers 2003),
or from some other mechanism. Thus, social networks clarify the route of
inﬂuence, but not necessarily the mechanism of inﬂuence.12
Blau space models provide a practical way to capture the social environ-
ment of individuals, including their many unmeasured relationships and ca-
sual contacts, thereby supplementing and expanding on traditional network
methods. Persons who are close in a Blau space model are demographically
similar and, because of homophily, are likely to be directly connected to each
other, to be connected by short chains of intermediaries, and to have frequent
casual contact. Put differently, similar individuals aremore likely to be sorted
(by structural effects) into the same foci, where they can then develop rela-
tionships (e.g., persons of similar socioeconomic status [SES] are more likely
to share neighborhoods than those of disparate SES). While this does not
guarantee that all individuals who are similar are equally available for asso-
ciation, it does explain why similar individuals are more likely to be associ-
ates, to have associates in common, and to encounter each other casually than
dissimilar individuals. Blau space models thus capture the organizational
context, while avoiding “social telepathy,” and eliminate or reduce the need
for often unattainable types of network data. Moreover, organizational leak-
age in Blau space provides a more concrete mechanism of inﬂuence. Organi-
zations provide a reservoir of individuals who possess organizational iden-
tities, conform to organizational behaviors, and subsequently both expose
nonmembers to these behaviors and help legitimate them, thereby encourag-
ing adoption.Moreover, the number of organizations competing in an area of
Blau space conditions the amount of inﬂuence any one organization exerts
(see below for a longer discussion of this issue). Finally, ourBlau space–based
approach requires only comparatively innocuous, and frequently available,
data on demographics and group membership. As long as we can construct
niches based on member attributes and compare those niches to nonmember
characteristics, we are able to capture casual contact. And while our Blau
space–based method cannot detect copresence with the precision of Sun
et al. (2013) or Frank and his colleagues, it can probabilistically capture ca-
sual contact across a wider variety of contexts (e.g., extracurricular activities,
places of residence).
12 Particular thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this issue more ﬁrmly to our
attention.
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Hypotheses
If organization members tend to engage in a particular behavior, individu-
als within the organization’s Blau space niche are likely both to observe this
behavior and to ﬁnd themselves in a social environment that endorses the
behavior. As a result, the organization-typical behavior ismore likely to enter
the behavioral repertoire of those located in the niche and is more likely to be
legitimated by residents of the niche, even if those individuals are not mem-
bers of the organization whose niche they occupy.
As an example, suppose a business school requires its professors to wear
suits to class. These business professors will be seen dressed in suits on cam-
pus but also tend to reside in neighborhoods, eat in restaurants, and other-
wise occupy settings populated by individuals with similar characteristics
(i.e., others who are proximate in a Blau space model). These others will ob-
serve the professors wearing suits, even if they are not direct associates of
the professors (i.e., casual contact), thereby making this fashion choice both
more cognitively available and more legitimate. In response, some of these
persons may adopt suits of their own and trigger a further cascade of adop-
tions that popularizes suits throughout the niche. Thus, organizational leak-
age can make an organization-typical behavior become pervasive through-
out the local social world. Further, the presence of the organization helps to
legitimate the norm and protect it against alternatives. Organizations com-
peting overmembers thus cast a shadow over Blau space; those in the shadow
(i.e., in the niche) are inﬂuenced by the behaviors of the organization to a
greater extent than those outside of the shadow.
Other scholars have made use of the individual’s own Blau space posi-
tion (i.e., one’s demographic characteristics) in studies of norms and behav-
ior (e.g., Friedkin and Johnsen 1997; Friedkin 2001), but we argue that it is
not the individual’s absolute position in the Blau space model that is impor-
tant, but rather the individual’s location relative to competing organiza-
tions (e.g., whether one is within a particular niche). Since organizations
are in competition, and that competition causes niches to move through
Blau space, one’s proximity to a niche will change over time (i.e., niche lo-
cations can change as a result of competition even if individuals remain at
the same coordinates). As a result, it is the competitive ecology in a Blau
space model, rather than the Blau space location itself, that inﬂuences the
likelihood of adopting particular behavioral norms.
In contrast to studies of social contagion that view behaviors as spreading
at will through social ties (e.g., Coleman et al. 1966; Newman, Barabási,
and Watts 2006; Centola and Macy 2007; Christakis and Fowler 2007;
Fowler and Christakis 2008; Flache and Macy 2011; Barash, Cameron,
and Macy 2012), we suggest that organization-typical behaviors are more
“contagious” when an individual is close to that organization and less so
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elsewhere. The adoption and maintenance of a norm are predicated on the
ability of group members to mutually inﬂuence one another, but individuals
who are separated by a path of more than two steps (i.e., the shortest path be-
tween them contains more than one intermediary) have a relatively weak im-
pact on each other’s behavior (Friedkin 1983). As a result of homophily, as
distance to the organizational niche in a Blau space model increases, the
probability of even one two-step path declines and the organization loses
its ability to meaningfully inﬂuence individual behavior. Likewise, at greater
distances from an organization’s niche, fewer individualswill consistently ex-
hibit its typical behaviors, thereby reducing the endorsement the behavior re-
ceives and its resulting legitimacy. Thus while organization-typical behavior
may still spread throughout a network, organizational leakage provides only
a local advantage and is distinct from more general diffusion models. The
particular power of an organization to encourage the adoption and mainte-
nance of norms does extend beyond its boundaries, but it does not extend
far beyond those boundaries. This leads to the following hypothesis:
NICHE MEMBERSHIP HYPOTHESIS.—Individuals located within a particular
organization’s niche, regardless of their membership in the organization, are
more likely to exhibit behaviors characteristic of that organization than in-
dividuals located outside of that organization’s niche.
Competition in a Blau space model is primarily driven by the limited time
that humans can devote to a given activity; any time spent practicing the har-
monica, for example, is time not spent playing basketball. In areas of Blau
space where two or more organizational niches overlap, two or more sets
of organization-typical behaviors are competing for the same pool of time.
As a result, an individual who adopts a new behavior may have to displace
an existing behavior, and not all occupants of an organizational niche (i.e.,
nichers) are exposed to equal competitive pressures. We distinguish between
two types of nichers: exclusive nichers, who arewithin the niche of only a sin-
gle organization, and manifold nichers, who are within the niches of several
organizations. Exclusive nichers have networks that are largely bounded by
an organization,whereasmanifold nichers possess unbounded networks con-
necting them to multiple organizations. In the former case, individual net-
works tend to lead to only a single reference group: only one set of behaviors
are routinely cognitively available to, and legitimated for, the individual, be-
cause there is only one organization inﬂuencing the individual.As a result, the
individual is more likely to exhibit those behaviors even if she never formally
joins the organization whose niche she occupies. In the latter case, individual
networks lead to several different reference groups,multiple sets of behaviors
are available, and multiple organizational identities and cultures are present
and in direct competition, thereby reducing the inﬂuence felt from any one of
them.As a result, the individualmay exhibit the behaviors characteristic of at
least one organization but is less likely to exhibit all the behaviors character-
American Journal of Sociology
800
istic of any speciﬁc organization or to exhibit only those behaviors.Moreover,
while individualsmay be aware of this competition, no such awareness is nec-
essary for these effects to occur: if two organizations are exploiting the same
pool of human time, they are in competition.
Returning to our earlier example, imagine that the suit-wearing business
school professors share their local area of Blau space with a second group:
engineering professors. These engineering professors have settled on jeans
and a collared shirt as standardwork attire andwill also be seen on campus,
in neighborhoods, restaurants, and other settings populated by similar others.
Because the niche of the business school professors overlaps with the niche
of the engineering professors (i.e., it is composed of demographically similar
individuals), both types of professorswill be seen in the same settings and by
the same people. Thus both suits and jeans-and-shirts will be cognitively
available and normatively acceptable to others in the area of overlap, but
individuals cannot wear both styles of dress simultaneously, creating com-
petition between them. And because this diversity of dress reduces the level
of endorsement that either receives, nonmembers are exposed to less (and
less consistent) inﬂuence to dress one way or the other. It may still be likely
that each of these modes of dress will spread to others, but the diversity of
options makes it less likely that any given person in the overlapping area
will, for example, adopt suits speciﬁcally or that suits become dominant gen-
erally. This leads to the following hypothesis:
NICHE OVERLAP HYPOTHESIS.—Individuals who are located in only a sin-
gle niche (i.e., exclusive nichers), regardless of their membership in the orga-
nization, aremore likely to engage in the organization’s typical behaviors than
are individualswho are located in two ormore niches (i.e., manifold nichers).
Our concept of organizational leakage is consistent with social identity
theory (SIT; e.g., Tajfel 1982; Hornsey 2008); organizations foster particu-
lar identities (Ashforth andMael 1989), and these identities produce behav-
iors (Eccles and Barber 1999; Barber et al. 2001). Moreover, once they de-
velop, these identities can become widely dispersed throughout a “crowd,”
only some of whom are members of the organization (e.g., Newman and
Newman 1976; Brown et al. 1986; Brown and Lohr 1987). However, social
identity theory also predicts that when identity is challenged, individuals
adhere more closely to an identity prototype andmaximize their distinctive-
ness from other groups (e.g., Hogg and Terry 2000; Ellemers et al. 2002).
Thiswould lead to an expectation that organization-typical behaviors should
be exhibited at higher levels in areas of manifold niche overlap, where iden-
tities are in conﬂict, than in areas of exclusive niche overlap, where one or-
ganizational identity dominates, which is contrary to our expectations.More-
over, SIT’s effects occur when the individual adopts the corresponding
identity (e.g., athlete), whereas our theory requires only contact with the or-
ganization.
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Organizational leakage is also consistent with social comparisons theory
(SCT; e.g., Festinger 1954; Goethals 1986); individuals seek to evaluate their
performance and, when objectivemeasures are unavailable, will make use of
comparisons to others. Even when objective measures are available, social
comparisonsmay still be used and can exert a greater effect on the individual
than objective indicators (Klein 1997).Moreover,while comparisons aremade
promiscuously, greater emphasis is placed on comparisons to similar others
(Gilbert, Giesler, andMorris 1995). SCTmight therefore lead us to a similar
expectation that individuals will tend to adopt the behaviors of those nearby
in Blau space so as to compare favorably with them.However, later research
indicates signiﬁcant ﬂuidity in the criteria used to select others for social com-
parisons (Wilson and Ross 2000) and that comparisons are often made to a
set of “typical” others, without regard to their similarity on relevant details
(Mussweiler and Ruter 2003). In other words, SCT argues that individuals
shape their own behavior on the basis of the behaviors of others, as do we,
but is not speciﬁc that the relevant set of others are casual contacts as mea-
sured through Blau space. Moreover, SCT does not produce our niche com-
petition effects. Therefore, while our theoreticalmodel has some obvious con-
sistencies with both SIT and SCT, it nonetheless makes distinct predictions
and is not identical to either.13
In summary, we argue that the norms and behaviors common in organi-
zationswill spread to thosewho are socially proximate through a processwe
term “organizational leakage” and that this process is moderated by the
competition between organizations. Organizational leakage occurs via on-
going relationships (i.e., network ties), indirect ties, and casual contacts and
is therefore difﬁcult to fully measure with traditional network methods. We
use Blau space modeling to capture casual contact, proximity, and compe-
tition and derive a set of hypotheses relating overlap in a Blau space model
to individual behavior (see ﬁg. 1).
Scope Conditions
We deﬁne ﬁve scope conditions for our theory. First, our theory is limited to
structurally cohesive (often face-to-face) groups. Commonmembership in a
group increases the likelihood of casual contact, but many groups are so
large that it is impossible for any one member to know all of the others.
As a result, normative consensusmay emerge primarily at the subgroup level
rather than for the group as a whole. In such cases, the subunits of an orga-
nization would qualify as “groups” under our theory and ought to exhibit or-
ganizational leakage. Returning to our earlier example, the business school
and engineering school are subunits of a university. Each of these subunits,
13 We also do not regard this work as a test of either SCT or SIT.
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which operate on a face-to-face basis, functions as a separate normative
group from the other even though they are nested within a larger structure.
Similarly, different norms and behaviors might become common in different
branches of a business, especially if they are geographically distant. The crit-
ical factor is whether the group as a whole is sufﬁciently well connected and
cohesive as to allow a behavior to become normative throughout. On the ba-
sis of prior work (Friedkin 1983), we suggest that organizations in which the
average geodesic path (i.e., shortest path throughanetwork) separatingmem-
bers is of length two or less will be sufﬁciently cohesive. Face-to-face groups,
in which all members are directly acquainted, are a special conforming case.
Whilewewould certainly expect somedegree of normative consensus through-
out a large organization, often as a result of policy directives, the effects we
describe are limited to structurally cohesive groups or subgroups.
Second, our theory is limited to behaviors about which (sub-)groups ex-
hibit normative consensus. Some groups are functionally homogeneous, fa-
FIG. 1.—Exclusive and manifold nichers in a two-dimensional Blau space with three
competing organizations.
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voring the development of many behavioral norms. Other groups, while co-
hesive, are functionally heterogeneous, thus favoring the development of
norms applying more narrowly to functionally equivalent individuals (e.g.,
separate norms for professors and department staff ). We expect organiza-
tional leakage to occur most reliably when the leaking behavior is held widely,
rather than narrowly, by organization members.
Third, in order for ideas or behaviors to leak via casual contact, theymust
be observable in other contexts and can therefore be adopted by persons
present in these contexts. Some behaviors, such as the wearing of suits or
polo shirts, will be easily observable in almost any context and thus should
spread quite easily via casual contact. Other behaviors, such as particular
ways of presenting statistical coefﬁcients, may spread readily in certain con-
texts (e.g., joint meetings between engineering faculty and industry person-
nel) but not in others (e.g., in restaurants). Finally, some behaviorsmay never
be exhibited outside of the relevant organization (e.g., norms for interaction
in a faculty meeting) and thus will be unable to spread. We anticipate orga-
nizational leakage to occur for a behavior only when it can be observed
in nonorganizational contexts and that it will spread only to those who
are present in those contexts to observe it.
Fourth, leaking behaviors will be adopted by individuals in the local so-
cial context only when the behaviors are usable by those individuals. In the
above example, observability is the key criterion as effectively all individu-
als wear clothing, and thus all individuals could conceivably adopt these
suits or collared shirts. But if the engineering faculty members were to dis-
cuss norms of hypothesis testing around staff members in their depart-
ments, these behaviors might not spread simply because those persons have
no particular need to formally test hypotheses in the ﬁrst place. That said,
we note that if a behavior is exhibited or otherwise comes up in a setting, it is
likely that it is relevant to at least certain members, or circumstances, of the
context. Additionally, even if exposed individuals do not exhibit the behav-
ior, they are nevertheless exposed to it and will become more favorable to it
because of the mere exposure effect.
Fifth, in order for the effects of niche overlap to be felt, the two niches
must be able to compete for the same individuals; in other words, the orga-
nizations must be members of the same organizational ecology. For exam-
ple, a fraternal organization and a sports organization that have identical
niches and recruit from the same city are members of the same ecology
and are in competition. In contrast, if the same two organizations had iden-
tical niches but recruited from different cities, they would not be in compe-
tition for the same pool of individuals and therefore would not be members
of the same ecology. Similarly, while niches can be constructed for organi-
zations at a very high level (e.g., national level), these niches imply very little
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concrete interaction between individualswithin them, and thus our predicted
effects should be reduced or eliminated entirely.
In the future we believe that several of these conditions can be relaxed.
However, relaxing these scope conditions will require additional theoretical
and empirical work, and so we set it aside pending empirical conﬁrmation
of our existing theory.
DATA, METHODS, AND ANALYTIC STRATEGY
Data
Our data derive from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to
Adult Health (or Add Health), a nationally representative sample of U.S.
adolescents (Harris 2009). These data were gathered by taking a stratiﬁed
sample of high schools (public and private) and then sampling students
from within these schools. The resulting data include measures of basic de-
mographics (e.g., sex, race, national origin), academicperformance, living sit-
uations, and attitudes and behaviors, as well as social networks. It is an es-
pecially good data set for this study because it combines information on a
number of behaviors (e.g., deviant activities such as ﬁghting or vandalizing
property), membership information for a number of groups (permitting the
calculation of niches), and sociometric social network data useful for dem-
onstrating the ability of a Blau space model to capture casual contact. Each
school is also a separate organizational ecology (i.e., an independent Blau
space), yielding a robust test of our hypotheses, and the collection of data from
schools guarantees that the respondents (i.e., students) have frequent physical
access to each other.14 Finally, much of the existing work on casual contact–
like processes, including the research on crowds (e.g., Newman andNewman
1976; Brown et al. 1986; Brown and Lohr 1987; Eder and Parker 1987) and
local positions (e.g., Field et al. 2006; Crosnoe et al. 2008; Frank et al. 2008,
2013), has relied on data on adolescents in general and the AddHealth in par-
ticular. While our theory is not speciﬁcally about adolescents, the multiple
ecologies contained in the AddHealth are essential to a valid test and simplify
comparisons between our work and related efforts. This is therefore an ideal
data set for testing our theory.
The Add Health data were collected longitudinally, but most of the var-
iables required for our analysis are available only inwave 1, which forces us
to use a cross-sectional approach. Our hypotheses can be evaluated without
the use of longitudinal data, and the implications of this limitation are dis-
cussed at greater length below. Wave 1 includes both an in-school question-
naire and an in-home interview conducted somewhat later. The in-school
14 We are unaware of any similarly detailed data that contain somany separate ecologies.
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questionnaire was administered to 90,118 students between September 1994
and April 1995 on a single day, determined uniquely for each school, using
paper forms that were distributed to all students present in school on that
day. This attendee sample was then supplemented by 20,745 in-home inter-
views conducted by a member of the research team between April and De-
cember 1995. Respondents to the in-home survey were drawn from the orig-
inal sampling frame, regardless of their participation in the in-school data
collection. These data were collected using both a face-to-face interview
and an A/CASI (audio computer-assisted self-interview) system that allowed
the respondents to complete sensitive portions of the survey in relative pri-
vacy, using headphones to listen to the questions and a computer to respond.
This methodology allowed the adolescents to respond truthfully to questions
about deviant activities such as violence or drug usewithout being overheard
by others, and the resulting data on deviant behavior are highly reliable. Be-
causewemake use of variables from both the in-home and in-school surveys,
our data are limited to those who were respondents in both.
Independent Variables
To test our hypotheses and the underlying theoretical model, wemust create a
Blau space for each school that includes both the positions of individuals and
the organization niches. This requires that we ﬁrst select a set of dimensions to
deﬁne the Blau space; second, determine the niche positions of the organiza-
tions; and third, identify the positions of individuals relative to the niches.
We deﬁne our Blau space using four variables that affect association:
Add Health Picture Vocabulary Test score (AHPVT) as a proxy for intelli-
gence; body mass index (BMI) as an indicator of physical condition; the in-
terviewer’s assessment of the respondent’s level of physical development
relative to same-age others; and the respondent’s family income as indicated
by a parent, most often the resident mother, as a measure of SES.15 Individ-
uals are located at positions inBlau space corresponding to their unique com-
binations of characteristics.
We selected these four variables for several reasons.16 First, they are char-
acteristics that affect patterns of association. Adolescents select associates
on the basis of BMI similarity (Crosnoe, Frank, and Mueller 2008; Hayea
15 The AHPVT is an abridged, age-standardized version of the Peabody Picture Vocab-
ulary Test. BMI was calculated from respondent weight and height using the standard
method (e.g., Schaefer, Kornienko, and Fox 2011).
16 An arbitrarily large number of variables can be chosen to create a Blau space, but pre-
vious studies have used up to four. For example, McPherson’s organization-level model
(1983) picked age, occupational prestige, education, and sex, while Mark’s individual-
level model (1998) used age, occupational prestige, education, and income. We use four
variables for consistency with prior literature and as a compromise between speciﬁcity
and parsimony.
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et al. 2011; Simpkins et al. 2012), physical development relative to same-age
peers (Stattin and Magnusson 1990; Drapela, Gebelt, and McRee 2006),
family SES (Bearman, Moody, and Stovel 2004; Nathan 2008; Schaefer
et al. 2011), and intelligence (Richardson 1940; Bearman et al. 2004; Bur-
gess, Sanderson, and Umana-Aponte 2011; see also Schaefer et al. 2011;
Barnes et al. 2014). Moreover, both intelligence and SES have been shown
to inﬂuence the assignment of students to academic tracks (Gamoran and
Mare 1989), and these tracks structure friendships (Hallinan and Williams
1989; Kubitschek and Hallinan 1998). We also used exponential random
graph models (see Lusher, Koskinen, and Robins 2013) to conﬁrm that ad-
olescents in our data tend to associate with those like themselves on each of
these characteristics, controlling for demographic variables, organizational
comembership, and network endogeneity effects (see the appendix for de-
tails). Therefore, on the basis of both previous scholarship and analysis of
the existing data, we know that these dimensions help structure association
and are appropriate for our study. Second, while Blau space analyses of or-
ganizational competition have represented categorical dimensions (e.g., race,
sex) as the percentage ofmemberswho belong to a speciﬁc category (e.g., per-
centage female), this strategy cannot be used to plot the locations of individ-
uals (e.g., an organization can be 60%male and 40% female, but individuals
are male or female). As there are no validated techniques for including cat-
egorical dimensions in our individual-level analyses, we select only continu-
ous variables as Blau dimensions. For this reason,we also do not include age
or grade as Blau dimensions. These variables are clearly salient to our pop-
ulation and in principle are interval (age) or ordinal (grade). Nonetheless, ac-
ademic course selections are constrained by grade, and this variable behaves
more like a categorical variable in practice. Likewise, age is so strongly cor-
related with grade (r 5 .914, P < .001) that it exhibits the same deﬁciency.
Fortunately, while grade strongly constrains the academic lives of students,
it has a much weaker inﬂuence on voluntary organization participation.
Clubs, such as drama or band, discriminate weakly or not at all on the basis
of grade, while sports (e.g., football) often include both a junior varsity and
varsity division, each of which typically contains a mixture of grades. Omit-
ting potentially salient dimensions (e.g., race and sex) compacts the Blau space,
introducing individuals into a context in themodelwho do not, socially speak-
ing, belong there. This reduces the extent to which behavior appears to be
inﬂuenced by local context, and thus omitting these dimensions makes our
hypothesized effects harder to detect and our tests more conservative. We
also control for important categorical factors (including age) elsewhere in
our models, thereby determining their direct, as opposed to ecological, ef-
fects. Third, we use only demographic variables as dimensions in our Blau
space and do not use other factors such as attitudes; previous research (e.g.,
Mark 1998) has predicted cultural preferences using a demographic Blau
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space, suggesting that demographic factors are more often antecedent to
opinions than the reverse. Finally, the demographic factors we select are
generally not determined by respondent preferences. Parental income and
physical maturation are entirely out of the respondent’s control. Intelli-
gence is largely outside respondent control, although the measure we use
could hypothetically be improved with training. Finally, research suggests
that 68%–83% of the variance in BMI among adolescent girls is attributa-
ble to genetics (Duncan et al. 2009), and thus preferences likely have a very
limited impact on BMI. Respondents have limited or no control over their
positions on any single one of these dimensions and by extension have no
effective control over their position as measured using all four. Individual
preferences therefore cannot account for both Blau space position and indi-
vidual behavior.We do not normalize these dimensions in any way because
any valid normalization would have no impact on the degree of overlap be-
tween niches.
Using these four variables to create a Blau space is distinct from includ-
ing them as independent variables in standard regression analyses because
it relies on a different causal logic and avoids sacriﬁcing social detail on the
altar of linear effects (e.g., McPherson 2004). By using these variables to de-
ﬁne a Blau space, we focus on the individuals’ “action in context” (Abbott
1997, p. 1158) rather than on the aggregation of individuals into variables
(see also White, Boorman, and Breiger 1976; Abbott 1988). What matters
for predicting the outcome is the respondent’s position in Blau space rela-
tive to the niches of competing entities. As an analogy, if we were interested
in understanding the health effects of living near a toxic chemical spill, we
would determine the latitude and longitude of the spill as well as of each
household in the area and then use those coordinates to calculate the dis-
tances between each household and the toxic chemicals. Short distances
to the spill would likely predict poorer health, and greater distances better
health, but the causal factor is position relative to the spill (i.e., their context)
rather than coordinates. Similarly, our effects are driven by position relative
to the niches (e.g., whether one is overlapped by a niche or niches) rather
than the absolute position in Blau space (e.g., particular values for BMI
or income). Because the niches are located at different combinations of di-
mensions in each school (i.e., the ecology of each school is independent), any
effects we observe are unlikely to be attributable to speciﬁc combinations of
Blau space parameters. While any of our four Blau space dimensions could
be included as independent variables, and we do so for control purposes,
this speciﬁes a different relationship to our outcome and is not equivalent
to a Blau space approach.
Next, we deﬁne the niches that populate our Blau space by using mea-
sures of membership in several voluntary organizations (also referred to
as “groups” for simplicity), including athletic clubs (e.g., baseball/softball,
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football), academic clubs (e.g., math club, German club), artistic clubs (e.g.,
dance, theater), other clubs (e.g., Future Farmers of America), religious
youth group attendance, formal full-time employment, and gangs.17 These
are primarily voluntary organizations but nevertheless are groupswith unique
goals, cultures, and identities. For example, most of the athletic clubs are
dedicated to team sports, which require organization and encourage collec-
tive sentiment. Likewise, the Add Health asks about participation in a
“named gang,” implying that the group exists independent of speciﬁc indi-
viduals and is not just an informal collection of youths. Our data cannot dis-
tinguishmembership in speciﬁc groups (e.g.,working as awaitress fromwork-
ing as a saleswoman), but the proper level of analysis for Blau space is the
“species,” deﬁned as the organizational type, rather than the “individual,”
typically deﬁned as a speciﬁc organization (see also McPherson 1983; Eccles
andBarber 1999). It is well known that organizations that belong to the same
ﬁeld ormarket often exhibit similar norms andbehaviors (e.g., DiMaggio and
Powell 1983; Uzzi and Lancaster 2003). Because each of the adolescent clubs
aggregated into a group is located in the same school and will often share
members (e.g., the same individuals may compete in sports that occur in dif-
ferent seasons), this organizational isomorphism is likely to be especially ro-
bust in our case. Empirically, this method is advantageous because not every
speciﬁc organization (e.g., soccer team) is present in every school, but these
organizational species are invariably found in every school. Finally, existing
research has used this method of aggregation and found that adolescents
are more likely to develop a network tie if they share a species membership
(Schaefer et al. 2011), which supports the ecological validity of this approach.
Our aggregation of speciﬁc clubs into club types is thus appropriate theoret-
ically and practically. Roughly 87% of our ﬁnal analytic sample aremembers
of at least one of the groups described above, and the majority of those who
are not members are still overlapped by one or more niches. In the event that
participation in one group within a species makes participation in another
group in that speciesmore likely (e.g., soccer and baseball), then they are likely
to exhibit similar organization-typical behavior, consistent with our aggre-
gation. In the event that participation in one group makes participation in
17 Participation in religious youth groupsmaynot bewholly under the adolescent’s control
and thus may not be entirely “voluntary,” but this is likely to be the case to a greater or
lesser extent with any extracurricular activity. We include it to provide a more complete
picture of adolescent activity commitments. The Add Health asked a gang membership
question only inwave 2,whichwas collected approximately 12months afterwave 1,while
all other club membership items were asked only in wave 1. We therefore use the wave 2
data to specify the gang niche in wave 1. Because this question was retrospective (i.e.,
“Have you ever been initiated into a named gang?”), doing so will incorrectly classify only
individuals who were not gang members at wave 1 but became gangmembers by wave 2.
Otherwise, all data derive from wave 1. Gang membership was determined during the A/
CASI portion of the interview and is highly reliable.
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another group of the same species less likely, they are more likely to exhibit
different behavioral proﬁles, thus punishing our hypotheses. As such, ag-
gregating these groups to the species level is theoretically and practically ap-
propriate and does not unfairly advantage our hypotheses.
Although we calculate niches for a variety of groups, we test our hypoth-
eses by focusing on two types: gangs and athletic clubs. These two groups
are chosen for several reasons. First, they provide examples of both deviant
and nondeviant groups and therefore offer a rigorous test of our hypotheses.
We might reasonably expect that the factors that lead to gang-typical be-
havior differ from those that lead to athletic-typical behavior, and if our
model can predict both, it suggests that it is general in nature. Second, these
are both face-to-face groups, which should exhibit strongBlau space effects.
Finally, sufﬁcient behavioral measures (described below) are available for
each group, whereas the same types of variables are unavailable for other
groups (e.g., academic clubs).While we can locate the niches of other groups
in our Blau space model, we do not have independent measures of the typ-
ical behaviors of these groups to use as a dependent variable. These two
groups are thus appropriate on theoretical, substantive, and methodologi-
cal grounds. The niches for all group types (i.e., athletic groups, academic
groups, artistic groups, other school groups, religious youth groups, formal
full-time employment, and gangs) are included in our Blau space, and all
are used to determine niche overlap, but we predict the behaviors associated
only with athletic groups and gangs.
Having identiﬁed our groups, wemust deﬁne their niches and identify ar-
eas of overlap. Following McPherson (1983), our niches are centered on the
mean value of a parameter for a particular group and extend 1.5 SDs above
and below this mean. For example, if athletic clubs have a mean IQ of 102
with an SDof 8, the niche of athletic clubs in the IQ dimensionwould extend
from 90 to 114. We adopt this niche width because it has been found to pro-
vide the best ﬁt in several studies (McPherson 1983; McPherson and Smith-
Lovin 1988; McPherson and Ranger-Moore 1991; McPherson and Rotolo
1996; Mark 1998) and is strikingly close to the optimum niche width for bi-
ological organisms (i.e., somewhat more than 1.4 SDs; see Levins 1968).
Some studies have used other niche widths that provided more favorable
results (e.g., Popielarz andMcPherson 1995; Bonikowski 2010), andwe could
do the same, butweview a nichewidth of 1.5 SDs as having the greatest prior
justiﬁcation andprefer it to the alternatives.18Becauseweuse fourBlau space
dimensions, our niches are regular four-dimensional polygons. Individuals lo-
cated within a niche (i.e., whose Blau space coordinates are within 1.5 SDs
of the niche mean in all dimensions) are competed over by that organization
18 Sensitivity analyses show that our results are robust to changes in niche width but im-
prove somewhat if we use larger niches for gangs and smaller niches for athletic groups.
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but are not automatically members. Individuals outside a niche can become
members of that organization, though the likelihood decreases with increas-
ing distance from the niche. Two niches that occupy the same area of Blau
space (e.g., artistic clubs and full-time employment), partly or in whole, are
said to be overlapping, and we distinguish between areas of overlap, where
two or more niches are present, and areas of nonoverlap, where only one
niche is present.
Finally, to test our hypotheses, we created a set of binary independent var-
iables. To test the niche membership hypothesis, we generated a gang nicher
variable and an athletic nicher variable that equal onewhen the respondent is
within the niche of his or her school’s gang and athletic group, respectively,
and zero otherwise. Because these variables are calculated using each school’s
unique niches (i.e., the niches of each organization type are in different lo-
cations in each school), their effects depend on whether one is overlapped
by a particular niche or niches and not on the absolute Blau space param-
eter values (e.g., whether one has a high PVT score or low BMI).
To test the niche overlap hypothesis, we decomposed the nicher variables
into an additional pair of binary variables for exclusive nichers and mani-
fold nichers. The former equals one when the respondent is in the focal
niche (gang or athletic, depending on the model) for his or her school but
is not within the niche of any other organization. The latter equals onewhen
the respondent is bothwithin his or her school’s focal niche (gang or athletic,
depending on the model) and also in the niche(s) of one or more of the other
organizations in the ecology (e.g., artistic, athletic, religious youth group). A
single respondent cannot be both a manifold and an exclusive nicher, and
the omitted category is individuals who are outside the focal niche (i.e., non-
nichers). We expect that nichers will be more likely to exhibit organization-
typical (gang or athletic) behavior than those outside the niche, but exclu-
sive nichers will exhibit higher levels of the behavior thanmanifold nichers.
Proportions of our sample that fall into these categories are given in table 1.
Because niches cannot be deﬁned when the number of members is very
small (e.g., a standard deviation cannot be calculated from a single score),
we limit our analyses to schools with three or more gang members, for a to-
tal of 81 schools and 8,625 respondents.19
Blau space is a useful tool because of its similarity to a physical space, but
it is not a physical space. As a result, measuring “distance” in a Blau space
model runs the risk of incorporating features that are appropriate physically
but are not appropriate socially. First, prior research (Burt 1991) indicates
that a unit difference in a single dimension (e.g., 5 years of age) can exert a
variable inﬂuence on association across the range of that dimension (e.g., as-
19 Imposing the same requirement for athletic groups has no effect as there are always at
least three athletic group members in any given school.
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sociation between a 12- and 17-year-old is less likely than between a 30- and
35-year-old). Thus, distance calculated in terms of the raw dimension may
be misleading. Second, in contrast to a physical space, the social distance
between point A and point B in a dimension can differ from the distance
between point B and point A (e.g., individuals are more likely to form rela-
tionships with those higher in a status hierarchy than with those lower; see
Laumann 1965, 1966; Brashears 2008b). Finally, while physical dimensions
are measured in common units (inches, meters, etc.), Blau space dimensions
are not (BMI units, thousands of dollars, etc.). As a result, while it is mathe-
matically possible to calculate the distance between points separated by two
ormore dimensions (i.e., the hypotenuse of a triangle whose legs are in differ-
ent dimensions), the meaningfulness of this distance is unclear. Moreover,
transforming the dimensions into a common metric (e.g., z-scores) would
not compensate for differences in social meaningfulness. In summary, linear
distance measures in Blau space models incorporate assumptions about so-
cial space that are unlikely to be theoretically reasonable.
Empirically, we ﬁnd that most of themanifold nichers are located toward
the center of their niches, while the exclusive nichers appear near the edge.
This is unsurprising asmost of the niches are clusteredwhere there aremore
individuals to be recruited (i.e., where the carrying capacity is greatest; see
McPherson and Ranger-Moore 1991). Moreover, in our sensitivity analyses
for niche width (see n. 18 above), using smaller niches that are more concen-
trated on the niche centers did not invariably lead to improvements in ﬁt. As
such, our data are inconsistent with a simple model wherein proximity to
the center of a niche, without regard to competition, predicts behavior. Our
focus on niche overlap (i.e., our nicher, exclusive nicher, and manifold nicher
binary variables), rather than linear distance, is therefore appropriate on the-
oretical and empirical grounds.
Dependent Variables
Our dependent variables are indices of the frequency with which respon-
dents engage in athletic-related and gang-related activities. We use the
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics for the Ecological Variables (N 5 8,625)
Variable Percentage of Population
Gang nicher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.0
Gang manifold nicher . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.4
Gang exclusive nicher . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6
Athletic nicher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60.0
Athletic manifold nicher . . . . . . . . . . 58.9
Athletic exclusive nicher . . . . . . . . . . 1.1
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15-item Add Health delinquency scale as our index of gang-related activi-
ties, and thus our index is similar or identical to that used in other studies.20
We created an index of athletic-related behaviors by having three under-
graduate coders independently search the Add Health codebook and iden-
tify items that captured behaviors they believed to be typical of athletic
clubs. Any variable on which the coders unanimously agreed was included,
resulting in a two-variable (i.e., play an active sport, engage in various
forms of exercise) index of athletic activities (see table 2).21 All items in both
scales measure behavioral frequency (preceding week for athletic activities
and preceding 12months for delinquency) and are scaled from 0 to 3, where
0 corresponds to “never,” 1 to “1 or 2 times,” 2 to “3 or 4 times,” and 3 to “5 or
more times.” For simplicity, we sum these variables, and thus the indices
capture the number of activities the respondent engages in and the intensity
of engagement. Measures of construct validity support our gang-related ac-
tivities index (a5 0.831) as well as our athletic-related activities index (q5
0.257, P < .001).22
Our dependent variables are measures of organization-typical behavior
but are nonetheless quite generic. For example, it might in some ways be
more compelling if we showed that a behavior unique to a particular group
(e.g., adoption of a speciﬁc type of clothing by all football players) were to
leak into the surrounding social environment.We do not adopt this approach
for two reasons. First, such speciﬁc and idiosyncratic indicators are, by def-
inition, speciﬁc and idiosyncratic and thus are not consistent across schools or
captured in any systematic way in our data. In contrast, athletic-related and
gang-related behaviors should be common to these groups across all of our
schools and are adequately measured. Second, while speciﬁc and idiosyn-
cratic behaviors would be quite useful, they are substantively less interesting
than showing that our model can predict meaningful behaviors, such as the
propensity to exercise (in light of the obesity epidemic) or propensity to engage
in delinquent behavior (which has obvious, potentially lifelong, consequences).
Thus, our selection of these more generic behavioral scales reﬂects method-
ological demands, data limitations, and a desire to show the substantive im-
portance of organizational leakage.
20 Haynie (2001), who also used the Add Health, employed a 14-variable index of delin-
quent activity, 12 of which overlapwith ours. If we substituteHaynie’s scale for our own,
the results do not change markedly.
21 Employing the same procedure for deviant activities reproduced the Add Health de-
linquency scale, indicating that this method produces sensible results.
22 Spearman’s rho is used for the athletic-related behaviors index because Cronbach’s al-
pha produces small values when the number of items is low. As a check, we computed
Cronbach’s alpha for several pairs of items from the gang-related behaviors index,
and the value was always comparable to the athletic-related behaviors index.
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Control Variables
We include several control variables in our analyses. First, we include four
social network variables to distinguish the direct inﬂuence of friends from
the effect of niche position. The Add Health asked respondents to identify
their (one or ﬁve) best male and (one or ﬁve) best female friends. These net-
work data provide measures of the respondents’ strongest ties but almost
certainly do not capture all of their ongoing relationships, much less their
casual contacts. Identifying effects from our nicher variables while control-
ling for these strong ties would indicate that our respondents are being in-
ﬂuenced by social contacts (e.g., classmates and other acquaintances) other
than their closest associates, consistent with organizational leakage. We be-
ginwith a variable for the proportion of all close friends (i.e., those identiﬁed
by the Add Health network items) who are afﬁliated with the focal organi-
zation; a larger proportion of close friends who are gang or athletic club
members should increase the respondent’s engagement in deviant or ath-
letic activities, respectively (Jussim and Osgood 1989; Matsueda and An-
TABLE 2
List of Variables Used in Creating the Dependent Variables (N 5 8,625)
Variable Mean SD
Deviant activities: In the past 12 months, how often did you:
Paint grafﬁti or signs on someone else’s property or in a public place? . . . .14 .49
Deliberately damage property that didn’t belong to you? . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 .59
Lie to your parents or guardians about where you had been or
whom you were with? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95 1.05
Take something from a store without paying for it? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 .78
Get into a serious physical ﬁght? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42 .74
Hurt someone badly enough to need bandages or care from a
doctor or nurse? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 .57
Run away from home? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .09 .35
Drive a car without its owner’s permission? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 .47
Steal something worth more than $50? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .07 .35
Go into a house or building to steal something? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .07 .35
Use or threaten to use a weapon to get something from someone? . . . . . . .05 .30
Sell marijuana or other drugs? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 .52
Steal something worth less than $50? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33 .75
Take part in a ﬁght where a group of your friends was against
another group? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24 .58
Act loud, rowdy, or unruly in a public place? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73 .91
Deviant activities index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.22 5.15
Athletic activities: During the past week, how many times did you:
Play an active sport, such as baseball, softball, basketball, soccer,
swimming, or football? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.42 1.14
Do exercise, such as jogging, walking, karate, jumping rope,
gymnastics, or dancing? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.63 1.04
Athletic activities index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.07 1.74
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derson 1998; Haynie 2001).23 Respondents whose close friends engage in
more deviant or athletic activities should also engage in more of these activ-
ities themselves, and so we include the mean level of deviant or athletic ac-
tivity among the respondent’s close friends as a control.24 The respondent’s
level of sociability may have an independent effect on collective behaviors
(e.g., by determining their level of demographic availability), and we in-
clude a measure of the amount of time spent with close friends during the
preceding week. Finally, we include a dichotomous variable for the respon-
dent’s membership status in the focal group to ensure that niche overlap has
an impact net of membership.
Second, drawing on existing research, we include two psychological var-
iables and one availability variable that should directly affect both deviant
and conventional behaviors: quality of parent-child relationship, attach-
ment to school, and level of truancy. These behaviors are thought to exert
their effects on the outcome variables independent of our network or niche
variables. Research suggests that a strong parent-child relationship decreases
the likelihood of engaging in deviant behaviors (Gove and Crutchﬁeld 1982).
Because mothers are often the primary or custodial caregivers, we measure
the quality of the parental relationship using an item capturing the respon-
dent’s closeness to his or her mother. A close attachment to one’s school has
also been found to decrease an adolescent’s deviant behaviors (Dornbusch
et al. 2001), and a strong attachment might also increase engagement in con-
ventional behaviors (e.g., athletic behaviors) that are associated with the
school. We measure attachment to the school using the respondent’s self-
report. Finally, truancy, which by deﬁnition reduces engagement in school,
can lead to increased involvement with delinquent peers and greater devi-
ance (Henry and Huizinga 2007). We measure truancy as the self-reported
frequency of skipping school without an excuse.25
Third, we included three demographic variables: sex, age, and race.26 Sex
is coded 1 if the respondent is female and 0 if male, age ranges from 10 to 19,
23 Substituting a binary variable indicatingwhether any of the respondent’s friends are in
the focal group produces similar results.
24 We are interested in ecological effects, so we include both the saturation schools, where
all students were recruited, and the nonsaturation schools, where probability sampling
was used. This variation in data structure precludes the use of cross-sectional contagion
models (e.g., Marsden and Friedkin 1993), but our mean activity level variable is a rea-
sonable substitute.
25 Truancy was not included in the deviance index because our coders did not judge it as
being uniquely associated with gangs and it was not part of the Add Health delinquency
scale.
26 Age and grade are strongly correlated (r5 .914,P< .001) and so cannot both be included
in the same model. We use age because its greater dispersion provides somewhat more
information. Estimating ourmodels using grade instead produces substantively identical
results.
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and race is coded 1 if respondents marked their race as white and 0 other-
wise. These variables are included because they inﬂuence association (e.g.,
Marsden 1987, 1988; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; Ibarra 1995; Bra-
shears 2008a; Smith et al. 2014) and, in certain schools, may be directly re-
lated to the dependent variables (e.g., if more sports clubs are available for
males than for females).
Finally,we include our four Blau space parameters—AHPVT score, phys-
icalmaturity, BMI, and family income—as controls. These allowus to distin-
guish our ecological proximity effects from the linear impact of the variables
making up our Blau space. A statistically signiﬁcant effect for any of these
variables would indicate that a dimension has a direct effect on the outcome
(e.g., higher-PVT individuals are more likely to be deviant), while a lack of
signiﬁcance indicates no direct effect on behavior. The lack of a direct effect
for a given control does not, however, mean that niche position in a Blau
space using that dimension is also nonsigniﬁcant in effect. Descriptive statis-
tics for the control variables are available in table 3.
Analytic Strategy
We test our hypotheses by regressing our nicher variables on engagement in
deviant and athletic behaviors, controlling for other effects. Both of our de-
pendent variables violate the normality assumption of ordinary least squares
regression, so we use negative binomial regression for deviant activities and
ordered logistic regression for athletic activities. Negative binomial regres-
TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables
Used in the Analysis (N 5 8,625)
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Gang membership (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 . . . 0 1
Athletic club membership (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54.6 . . . 0 1
Proportion of friends who are in a named gang (%) . . . . . .2 . . . 0 1
Proportion of friends who are in an athletic club (%) . . . 5.4 . . . 0 1
Friends’ mean deviant activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18 .67 0 11.38
Friends’ mean athletic activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 .38 0 4.8
Time spent with friends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.01 .98 0 3
Gender (female 5 1) (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50.5 . . . 0 1
Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.97 1.65 10 19
Race (white 5 1) (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67.5 . . . 0 1
Parent-child relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.54 .77 1 5
Attachment to school . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.56 1.16 1 5
Truancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59 1.19 0 6
PVT score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103.51 13.93 13 138
Physical maturity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.41 .83 1 5
BMI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.40 4.34 11.25 63.49
Family income (thousands) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49.97 52.29 0 999
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sion allows us to adjust for the positive skew and overdispersion present in
our index of deviant activities (Gardner, Mulvey, and Shaw 1995). Because
the athletic activities index has a restricted range consisting of integer values
(0–6), the ordinal logistic regression model provides a better ﬁt to the data
than the alternatives. In all models, we use robust standard errors to adjust
for clustering on schools in the Add Health data, and we employ sample
weights to control for differential sampling probabilities. The level of aggre-
gation is critical to applying the correct weights, and previous research using
Blau spacemodels has adopted either a national (e.g.,McPherson andRanger-
Moore 1991; Mark 1998; Bonikowski 2010) or a local (e.g., McPherson 1983;
Popielarz andMcPherson 1995) level. The choice depends partly ondata avail-
ability and partly onwhether themodeled entities are structurally able to com-
pete. Because schools are constrained to recruit from different school districts
and groups in one school do not compete for members in another, we con-
struct individual Blau space models for each school (i.e., adopt the local level)
and use only the level 1 within-school weight component to correct for design
effects within schools (Chantala and Suchindran 2011). This permits us to
make locally representative statements at the school level, which is appropri-
ate given that the Blau space ecologies of different schools are functionally
independent. Omitting the weights only slightly alters our results, but using
them represents the conservative approach.
Modeling proceeds in three stages. In the ﬁrst stage a model is estimated
for each dependent variable using nicher status as the sole independent var-
iable. A signiﬁcant effect for the nicher status variable would support our
niche membership hypothesis. All control variables, with the exception of
organizational membership status, are also included. In the second stage
we use the exclusive and manifold nicher variables, with the same controls,
to test our niche overlap hypothesis. In the third stage we retain the vari-
ables for exclusive and manifold nichers, as well as the previous controls,
but add the control for organizational membership status, providing amore
stringent test of the niche overlap hypothesis. Following these models, we
present a series of additional analyses to rule out alternative explanations
for our ﬁndings. Effects are given as incidence rate or odds ratios (depend-
ing on the model) in the text and the table, but untransformed coefﬁcients
are available on request.
RESULTS
Beginning with our control variables, our network, psychological, avail-
ability, and demographic controls reveal the anticipated effects (or lack
thereof) on the dependent variables (table 4).Membership in one of the focal
organizations (i.e., gangs or athletic clubs) dramatically increases the likelihood
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of participating in the associated activities. The amount of time spent with
friends produces signiﬁcant increases in the dependent variables across all
models. Having a larger proportion of friends who are members of the focal
group (i.e., gang or athletic club) exerts a positive inﬂuence that approaches
signiﬁcance for deviant activities and is signiﬁcant for athletic activities in
two models (i.e., models 4 and 5).27 The mean level of deviant activities of
one’s friends signiﬁcantly increases one’s own level of deviance in three
models (i.e., models 1–3).
Females and older students are signiﬁcantly less inclined toward both de-
viance and athletic participation in all models. As expected, a close attach-
ment to one’s school decreases the level of deviance in models 1–3, while it
increases the level of athletic participation in models 4–6. A strong parental
relationship reduces deviance across all models and increases athletic partic-
ipation in one model (i.e., model 6), while truancy increases deviant behavior
buthasnoeffect onathleticparticipation.White respondentsappear tobe some-
what less likely to engage in deviance than nonwhite respondents. Finally, our
fourBlauspaceparameters—AHPVTscore,physicalmaturity,BMI,and fam-
ily income—are weakly and inconsistently related, if at all, to our dependent
variables. Both physical maturity and family income appear to increase the
level of participation in athletic activities, while BMI has an occasional and
very weak positive impact on engagement in deviant activities. Our Blau
space parameters fail to show any consistent link to the dependent variables,
suggesting that any effects detected for our nicher variables are not the result
of a direct connection between a value of the dimension and the behaviors in
question.
This brings us to the main effects in our models. Do individuals’ ecological
positions in Blau space matter for behavioral outcomes, controlling for the
above direct effects? Our results (table 4) provide clear evidence that they
do.Model 1 indicates that thosewho are locatedwithin the gangniche engage
in signiﬁcantly more deviant activities than nonnichers (b5 1.207, P < .001),
even while controlling for other factors. Likewise, model 4 shows that those
within the athletic club niche engage in signiﬁcantly more athletic activities
(b5 1.133, P < .05) than those outside of it. Importantly, these effects are ob-
served even while controlling for the associational and dispositional charac-
teristics described above. Thus, all things being equal, it appears that niche
position does indeed inﬂuence both deviant and conventional behaviors. This
provides support for the niche membership hypothesis.
We then separate the nicher category into binary variables for exclusive and
manifold nichers and include both in our stage 2 analyses (i.e., model 2 and
27 An interaction between niche status and the proportion of member friends was also
tested but had no signiﬁcant effect.
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model 5). This allows us to determine if individual behaviors are affected by
theecological competitionbetweenorganizations,aspredictedbyournicheover-
lap hypothesis. Model 2 indicates that gang exclusive nichers, those who re-
side solely within the gang niche, have a substantially greater level of de-
viance than nonnichers (b 5 1.756, P < .001). Those who are within the gang
niche but who are also overlapped by other niches (i.e., gang manifold nichers)
are also more likely to engage in deviance than nonnichers (b 5 1.164, P <
.001). However, as predicted, the effect on exclusive nichers is greater than
that on manifold nichers (Wald v2 5 16.17, P < .001). Turning to athletic
clubs, we see inmodel 5 that athletic exclusive nichers engage in signiﬁcantly
higher levels of athletic activities than nonnichers (b5 1.970, P < .01). Man-
ifold nichers also have higher levels of athletic participation than those out-
side the niche (b5 1.120, P < .05 one-tailed), but again the exclusive nicher
effect is signiﬁcantly larger (Wald v25 6.15,P < .05). The results conﬁrm the
importance of niche overlap for predicting behavior and indicate that exclu-
sive nichers aremoreheavily inﬂuencedby their niche location than areman-
ifold nichers, supporting the niche overlap hypothesis. Notably, these mech-
anisms appear to operate for both legitimate and delinquent activities, and
position relative to the niches appears to have consistent effects across schools
even though the nichesmay be located indifferent places in theBlau spaces of
each school.
Although the precedingmodels supported both of our hypotheses, in stage 3
we add dichotomous variables for gang membership and athletic club mem-
bership tomodel 3 andmodel 6, respectively, to distinguish the effects of niche
overlap from the effects ofmembership. As onewould expect, includingmem-
bership reduces the size of our coefﬁcients, but it does not eliminate them. In
model 3 both exclusive nicher status (b5 1.281,P < .01) andmanifold nicher
status (b5 1.104,P< .05) continue to exert a positive effect on deviance, even
while controlling for gang membership. Moreover, the exclusive nicher ef-
fect remains the stronger of the two (Wald v2 5 2.71, P < .05 one-tailed),
as predicted. In model 6, exclusive nichers (b 5 1.683, P < .05) continue to
engage in higher levels of athletic activities, whilemanifold nichers no longer
differ signiﬁcantly from those outside the niche. While some of the niche ef-
fects in the earlier models derived from identifying group members in the
data, niche position nonetheless exerts an independent inﬂuence over both
members and nonmembers, providing continuing support for both of our
hypotheses.28
28 We also estimated models that included interaction effects between membership in the
organization and the manifold and exclusive nicher variables, but the interactions were
nonsigniﬁcant.
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Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the effects of exclusive and manifold nicher sta-
tuses on deviant and athletic behaviors, distinguished by the organizational
membership statuses, using predictions generated by models 3 and 6.
In both ﬁgures, the left set of columns shows the predicted levels for non-
members, while the right set of columns shows the levels for members.Within
thesemembership statuses, the leftmost column indicates the predicted values
of deviant or athletic activity for nonnichers (the reference group), while the
middle and the rightmost columns give the predicted values for manifold
nichers and exclusive nichers, respectively. The predictions were calculated
usingmeanvalues for all control variables. In bothﬁgures, the predicted value
of engagement increases noticeably as we move from nonnichers, to manifold
nichers, to exclusive nichers. These results are completely consistent with our
hypotheses, illustrating the important role that organizational leakage plays in
shaping the behaviors of adolescents.
BLAU SPACE MODELS AND ISSUES OF CAUSALITY
It is appropriate to be concerned about causal direction in research, but
unique features of the Blau space approach aswell as ﬁve additional analyses
lend support to our conclusions. First, Blau space models can appear tauto-
logical; niches are calculated from the mean characteristics of members, and
thus, by deﬁnition, members will be more common in the niche than outside
of it. However, in our research niches are calculated using an afﬁliation (i.e.,
FIG. 2.—Predicted level of engagement in deviant activities
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organizationalmembership), but they are used to predict behavior (i.e., athletic-
related and gang-related behaviors). In other words, while it is true by def-
inition that most members of an organization will be found within its niche,
it is not true by deﬁnition that most people who exhibit a particular behavior
will be found within an organization’s niche.
Second, those who engage in a certain type of activity might gravitate to-
ward particular values on theBlau dimensions (e.g., thosewho enjoy athletic
activity tend to develop a similar BMI) and produce a spurious association
between the two. As discussed above, our Blau space dimensions (i.e., BMI,
PVT score, physical maturity score, and parental income) are largely or com-
pletely beyond the control of the respondents. As such,while individuals’pref-
erences could lead them to join an organization or engage in a particular type
of behavior, they cannot determine Blau space position in one dimension (e.g.,
a preference for academic clubs cannot alter parental income), much less sev-
eral at once.
Third, our results might be due to the direct effect of the underlying Blau
space dimensions (e.g., parental income). Becausewe include our dimensions
as control variables, the effects of niche overlap are unlikely to be mistaken
for the direct effects of the dimensions. Additionally, the niches, and niche
overlaps, are not located at the same range of Blau space coordinates in each
school, while the results of overlap are consistent across schools. Table 5 gives
summary statistics for the niche centers (i.e., means) and widths (i.e., stan-
dard deviations) for each dimension and focal organization calculated across
FIG. 3.—Predicted level of engagement in athletic activities
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schools. Quite clearly, there is substantial variation both in where the niches
are centered and in the width of the niches from school to school. For exam-
ple, in the BMI dimension the gang niche is centered on a value ranging from
a low of roughly 15.97 to a high of 32.73, while in the PVT dimension a stan-
dard deviation for the athletic group ranges from a low of approximately 8.36
to a high of 27.72.While there is obviously clustering about a central tendency,
there is also considerable diversity.
Nevertheless, to further investigate this possibility we performed a pro-
pensity scorematching (PSM) analysis (Rosenbaum andRubin 1983; Rubin
2006). PSM methods simulate an experimental design using observational
data by matching each “treated” individual (e.g., a nicher) to one or more
“untreated” individuals who have similar propensities for being in the treat-
ment group (see Morgan and Winship 2007; Guo and Fraser 2010). This
method has a number of advantages over standard linear models (e.g., Mor-
gan and Todd 2008) and has previously aided in determining causation (e.g.,
TABLE 5
Descriptive Statistics for the Niche Centers and Widths of Blau
Parameters: Gangs and Athletic Groups
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Gang niche:
PVT score:
Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96.92 10.75 52.63 122.00
SD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.24 7.33 0 53.01
Physical maturity:
Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.29 .56 2 5
SD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60 .43 0 2.12
BMI:
Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.72 2.83 15.97 32.74
SD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.98 2.30 0 9.82
Family income:
Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34.69 19.85 2 102.45
SD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.35 18.47 0 114.59
Athletic group niche:
PVT score:
Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.76 8.40 45.29 119.45
SD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.66 3.29 8.36 27.72
Physical maturity:
Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.37 .27 2 4.09
SD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78 .19 0 1.36
BMI:
Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.07 1.21 19.34 26.11
SD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.87 .83 2.32 6.85
Family income:
Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47.56 23.53 8.10 188.32
SD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34.41 31.29 4.81 215.89
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Lundquist 2004; Diaz and Handa 2006; Trinitapoli and Vaisey 2009; Brand
andXie 2010). Because our focal niches are in different Blau space locations
in each school, it is possible to ﬁnd a considerable number of treated and un-
treated individuals with similar propensity scores. This permits us to com-
pare treated (e.g., nicher) and untreated (e.g., nonnicher) individualswho have
similar values on our Blau parameters, and a signiﬁcant difference between
them would be consistent with organizational leakage. We use kernel-based
matching (i.e., propensity score matching based on nonparametric regres-
sion; see Guo and Fraser 2010, chap. 7) on our Blau dimensions to identify
several matches for each treated individual. Our results show signiﬁcant dif-
ferences between the treated and untreated matches for both deviant behav-
ior (t5 8.269, P < .001) and athletic behavior (t5 3.742, P < .001). Using an
alternative stratiﬁcationmatching procedure on our Blau dimensions in place
of kernel-basedmatching produces substantively identical results for both de-
viant behavior (t5 8.919,P < .001) and athletic behavior (t5 2.419,P < .05).29
PSManalysis therefore supports our contention that the nicher effects are not
a consequence of respondent values on the underlying Blau dimensions.
Fourth, it could be that organizational niche position is the result of
organization-typical behavior rather than vice versa. For example, early in
childhood, individuals might be interested in particular groups, but as they
age, fewer and fewer remain active members (e.g., many teens have played
soccer, but few are on the high school team). This could leave a large number
of individuals within a group niche who exhibit its typical behaviors but are
not members. Alternatively, it may be that behaviors compete for adherents
and behavioral enthusiasts are more likely to join the corresponding organi-
zation. As a result, organizations draw their membership from among those
who already engage in their typical behaviors. Because organizational mem-
bership is measured only at wave 1, we cannot use a longitudinal analysis to
resolve this issue. However, if something like the above were to obtain, then
the organizational niche should be located within the niche of the behaviors.
Using the approach described by Mark (1998), we construct niches in each
school for our gang-related and athletic-related behaviors. These niches are
centered on the mean characteristics of those who exhibit high levels of gang-
related and athletic-related behavior and extend 1.5 SDs in each dimension.
We then create a new binary variable for behavioral nichers that equals one
when a respondent is within the focal behavioral niche and zero otherwise.
We estimate a new set of models identical to those in table 4 but with this
29 Stratiﬁcation matching based on the Blau dimensions as well as all remaining covar-
iates continues to support our conclusions (results omitted to save space).
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newbehavioral nicher binary variable included.We are therefore able to de-
termine if organizational overlaphas an effect after controlling for the under-
lying behavioral niche. The results (table 6) continue to support our hypoth-
eses. As expected, the behavioral nicher variable is a signiﬁcant predictor of
both deviant (models 7–9) and athletic (models 10–12) behaviors. The gang
nicher variable (model 7) remains a signiﬁcant, positive predictor of deviant
behavior (b5 1.210, P < .01), although the athletic nicher variable loses sig-
niﬁcance (model 10). This suggests that our niche membership hypothesis is
only partially supported. The manifold nicher variables are nonsigniﬁcant for
both deviant (models 8 and 9) and athletic (models 11 and 12) behaviors, al-
though the coefﬁcients remain in the anticipated direction for deviant behav-
iors.Models 8 and 9 indicate that the gang exclusive nicher variable remains
signiﬁcant for deviant behaviors bothwhen the control for clubmembership
is omitted (b5 1.757, P < .001) and when it is included (b5 1.293, P < .01).
Likewise, models 11 and 12 reveal that the athletic exclusive nicher variable
remains signiﬁcant for athletic behaviors both without (b5 1.810, P < .001)
and with (b 5 1.534, P < .05 one-tailed) the control for club membership.
This provides continuing support for our niche overlap hypothesis; being ex-
clusively overlapped by an organizational niche produces noticeably stronger
effects from organizational leakage. Therefore, organizational leakage has a
detectable and consistent effect on individual behavior even when control-
ling for the behavioral niche. Moreover, in model 8 the effect for exclusive
nichers is larger than the effect for behavioral nichers (Wald v2 5 6.87, P <
.01), while in all other models there is no signiﬁcant difference in the size of
their effects. In other words, in all models the effect of being an exclusive or-
ganizational nicher is equal to or larger than the effect of being a behavioral
nicher. That our effects of interest are so robust is particularly impressive
given the extensive set of controls we impose in our models.
Finally,wewere unable to include age or grade as Blau dimensions despite
their obvious relevance to the population under study, and thus it is possi-
ble that including them would somehow disrupt our results.30 Given that the
voluntary organizations included in these data are not especially selective on
grade or age, themost likelyway inwhich these variables could affect ourmod-
els would be by shaping the academic contexts in which students are lodged
and thus their social networks. However, while some required classes are
strongly associatedwith particular grades (e.g., Algebra I, English II), others
(e.g., physical education, language courses) are only weakly associated, and
electives (e.g., speech, web design, industrial arts) often contain a heteroge-
30 We did include age as a control variable without disrupting our predicted effects, and
parallel analyses using grade as a control are substantively identical.
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neousmixture of grades andages.As such, age or grade only imperfectly con-
trols for copresence in these settings and exposure to their inﬂuence. There-
fore, we estimate a new series of models that control for the local positions
(Field et al. 2006; Crosnoe et al. 2008; Frank et al. 2008, 2013) of our respon-
dents as proxies for their academic contexts. Data on the local positions of a
limited subset of respondents to the Add Health were obtained (see Muller
et al. 2007), and we estimated four newmodels (table 7) controlling for these
positions. The ﬁrst twomodels (models 13 and 14) predict deviant behaviors
while the second two models (models 15 and 16) predict athletic behaviors.
The ﬁrst model in each pair (models 13 and 15) is identical to, respectively,
models 3 and 6 from table 4, with the addition of a control for local position.
The second model in each pair (models 14 and 16) is equivalent to, respec-
tively, models 9 and 12 from table 6, with the addition of a control for local
position. In all cases, using the local position covariate reduces our sample
sizes by 50% or more relative to tables 4 and 6, with the consequent reduc-
tion in power. The results of this analysis (table 7) continue to support our hy-
potheses. Across all models, local position fails to predict the level of deviant
or athletic behavior, suggesting that these characteristics are essentially or-
thogonal to one’s location within the academic structure. Unsurprisingly,
the behavioral nicher variable is a signiﬁcant positive predictor of both devi-
ant (1.183, P < .05 one-tailed) and athletic (1.342,P < .05) behavior in models
where it appears. The manifold nicher variable is a signiﬁcant positive pre-
dictor of deviant behavior only in model 13 (1.187, P < .001) and loses signif-
icance in the subsequent model. Manifold nicher status is not a signiﬁcant
predictor of athletic behavior in any model. In contrast, the exclusive nicher
variable is a signiﬁcant positive predictor of both deviant behaviors (model
13: 1.526, P < .05 one-tailed; model 14: 1.568, P < .05) and athletic behaviors
(model 15: 2.661, P < .05; model 16: 2.268, P < .05 one-tailed) in all models.
Overall, this is consistent with our expectation that exclusive nichers should
bemore robustly associatedwith the organization-typical behavior thanman-
ifold nichers. As such, in light of both the substantially reduced power and the
inclusion of many controls, we view these results as supportive of ourmodel.
It appears unlikely that our results are an artifact deriving from our inability
to include age or grade as Blau dimensions. Moreover, these results are con-
sistent with our argument that local positions capture a different aspect of ca-
sual contact than ourmethod, thereby suggesting that both approaches canbe
employed together to achieve greater understanding of the social environment.
None of these supplemental analyses, taken in isolation, can entirely resolve
concerns with alternative causation. But collectively, our additional analyses
eliminate awide variety of possible alternatives. As a result, it is difﬁcult to see
what mechanisms could account for each school’s unique niche positions, as
well as the degree of overlap between them, producing our hypothesized ef-
fects, without actually being the mechanisms we hypothesize.
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DISCUSSION
Our research demonstrates that organizations and the competition between
them have a unique impact on individual behavior. Organizations develop
and legitimate their owndistinctive identities and cultures that provide a sup-
portive context for organization-typical behaviors. However, this supportive
context is not limited in effect to members but also affects nonmembers who
have frequent contact with the organization or those who belong to it. On the
whole, our results conﬁrm the importance of organizational leakage and sug-
gest that organizational culture plays a critical part in shaping the behavior
of members and nonmembers within the organization’s social locale. As a re-
sult, our research has implications for a wide range of sociological concerns.
First, this work speaks to the classicmacro-micro problem by showing how
microlevel behaviors are inﬂuenced by mesolevel processes (Marsden 1981;
Coleman 1986). Individuals and organizations have traditionally been treated
as different levels of analysis that respond to different causal mechanisms, but
our results suggest that individuals and organizations interact as part of a sin-
gle system. Our work shows one promising method for integrating multiple
levels into a single analysis, but we anticipate that many more are possible.
While not directly tested in this article, areas of niche overlap are also im-
portant because they may slow the diffusion of new practices. As contagion
becomes more costly to the individual in terms of time or resources, it is also
more likely to be affected by competition in Blau space. In other words, the
diversity of behaviors that compete for limited time in an area of niche over-
lap makes it less likely that a new entrant (e.g., behavior) will diffuse. Com-
petition is likely to be an especially serious constraint for complex contagions,
which require contacts frommultiple others in order to spread to a new indi-
vidual (Centola andMacy 2007; Barash et al. 2012). In areas of niche overlap
itwill be difﬁcult to produce the redundant contacts required by complex con-
tagions. Because only the most simple behaviors are exempt from competi-
tion for time and resources, themajority of phenomena that candiffuse through
social networks should be affected by organizational competition.31 Areas of
high niche overlap function as natural barriers to the diffusion of contagions,
separating the social world much as high mountains can separate disparate
cultures. Organizational competition has typically been ignored in studies of
contagion and diffusion, and thus our research represents a signiﬁcant step
forward. Nevertheless, our mechanism of organizational leakage provides a
competitive advantage only to organization-typical behaviors within the or-
ganization’s niche and thus is a supplement to, rather than a replacement for,
models of social contagion and diffusion.
31 A contagion that has no impact on behavior or time use is unlikely to be of interest pre-
cisely because it has no impact on behavior or time use.
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In addition, ourwork presents an innovative approach to studying certain
types of context effects. Social context is of long-standing interest to social
scientists (e.g., Durkheim [1851] 1997; Blalock 1984; Abbott 1997) but has
proven extremely difﬁcult to operationalize. When a mechanism is not spec-
iﬁed, social context appears to act as if an occult hand haddirectly inﬂuenced
the individual behavior. Specifying such amechanism through conventional
network analysis is partly effective, but measuring the vast number of rele-
vant relationships is prohibitively difﬁcult or, in the case of casual contacts,
nearly impossible. Even if a researcher is able to gather exhaustive data on one
or two relationship types, there remainmany other unobserved types through
which inﬂuence can ﬂow. Other methods of capturing casual contact are
available (e.g., local positions) but typically require very detailed data and
are often narrow in the types of contact that they can measure. We therefore
suggest that our approach ismost useful eitherwhen the data needed for local
position methods are unavailable or when the researcher wishes to capture a
larger fraction of the extant casual contacts. Our approach to context effects
relies on the mechanism of social networks but does not require exhaustive
social network data. Individualswho have similar values on salient variables
are sorted into the same types of positions (e.g., occupations, residential areas)
by structural forces and often choose each other for interaction (McPherson
et al. 2001). They are thus likely to experience similar environmental features
and to have higher rates of friendly and casual contact. Niches in Blau space
capture this wider social context in a probabilistic way and thus provide a
measure of social context that is grounded in the concrete mechanisms of so-
cial networks without their prohibitive data requirements. Our approach is
not intended to replace networkmethods but instead is a supplement (to cap-
ture casual contacts) or a useful alternative when network data are not avail-
able. We recognize that this type of analysis will be challenging for many re-
searchers to duplicate and so have produced a package named BlauNet for
the R statistical environment that automates niche calculations and performs
many other tasks needed to adopt our methods.32
Our work provides a unique way to model causal effects. In our model,
causation is not a linear function of the underlying parameters (i.e., variables)
that deﬁne ourBlau spacemodel because a change in a given parameter is not
invariably linked to a change in behavior. For example, an increase in edu-
cation will make it more likely that a person will engage in organization A’s
characteristic behaviors only as long as it pushes onemore deeply intoA’s ex-
clusive niche area. However, education beyond a certain point may remove a
person fromA’s exclusive niche, or evenmanifold niche, and lower the prob-
ability of adoption.We alsomight reasonably expect that organizational leak-
32 The package is available from https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/Blaunet/index
.html.
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age will be limited not just by the presence or absence of organizational com-
petition in an area of Blau space (i.e., exclusive vs. manifold nicher) but by the
degree of competition between organizations (i.e., the number of niches over-
lapping a manifold nicher). We focused on the exclusive/manifold nicher dis-
tinction because our schools contain a relatively homogeneous population, so
often eithermany niches are in competition or there is no competition. In a dif-
ferent empirical case it might be possible to study the impact of degree of com-
petition, but increasing competitionwill likely have a diminishing effect on be-
havioral adoption.
Aswith any research, this effort has certain limitations. Our data are based
on a sample of adolescents and thus are not representative of the population
at large. Nevertheless, most studies of homophily and Blau space have em-
ployed adult populations and give us good reason to expect that our model
will apply to adults.Wewere also limited in our ability to construct indices of
behaviors that corresponded to available organization types. Despite the
availability of data on membership in multiple groups, we were able to con-
struct valid dependent measures only for athletic groups and gangs. At the
same time, the robustness of our effects across both legitimate and illegiti-
mate activities, even when controlling for a variety of possible confounds,
strongly implies that ourmodel is general. Our work is limited because the tar-
get behaviors we predict were derived from naturalistic data by our coders
rather than induced experimentally. While experimental inducement of a
leaking behavior would be ideal, it is notoriously difﬁcult to introduce even
a single innovation (e.g., Rogers 2003), much less to successfully introduce
the same innovation dozens of times (i.e., to all of our independent ecologies).
Given that themicrofoundations of our theory have alreadybeen extensively
documented in laboratory studies (e.g., Zajonc 1968; Alexander et al. 1970;
Saegert et al. 1973; Brockner and Swap 1976; Swap 1977; Zucker 1977;
Moreland and Zajonc 1982), we think that this limitation is acceptable. Fi-
nally, while the Add Health data are longitudinal, items measuring organi-
zational membership were asked only during wave 1. Because some amount
of change in niche position is expected over time, we were limited to cross-
sectional models, preventing us from deﬁnitively ﬁxing the causal direction.
Nonetheless, given the nature of our predictors, the extensiveness of our con-
trols, and our subsequent efforts to rule out alternative explanations, it is un-
likely that endogenous artifacts are generating the consistent patterns of
niche overlap and behavior across the schools.
CONCLUSIONS
Our results strongly suggest that the competition between organizations can
affect the behaviors exhibited by the members and nonmembers who are
being competed over. Moreover, this is the case even when controlling for
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network effects, for variables that ought to have a direct effect on behavior,
and for the main effects of the variables that form our Blau space dimen-
sions. Our niche membership hypothesis received partial support, while
our niche overlap hypothesis was repeatedly supported, and as such, our
underlying model and concept of organizational leakage both receive con-
siderable validation.
Future research should explore the effects of using different Blau space
parameters and different numbers of parameters to predict behaviors. In-
creases in the dimensionality of the systemwill change the amount of overlap
between niches (Peli andBruggeman 2006), but there is no theoretical or em-
pirical method for selecting an appropriate set of dimensions.We follow pre-
vious work in this regard, selecting four dimensions that are salient to the
population under study, but this is a somewhat arbitrary criterion. Further
research should also use an adult population, but such an effort will require
the collection of new data drawn from multiple independent ecologies that
include measures of group membership, demographics, and adoption of be-
haviors characteristic of various groups. Additional effort should also be de-
voted to exploring what types of organizations can be modeled as members
of a common Blau space. Existing work on Blau space relies almost exclu-
sively on voluntary associations/organizations (e.g., McPherson 1983; Mc-
Pherson andRanger-Moore 1991; Popielarz andMcPherson 1995) or cultural
products (e.g., Mark 1998; Bonikowski 2010), but the model is applicable to
other types of organizations. Such an improvement would also cast addi-
tional light on our results;whilewe identiﬁed individualswhowerebeing com-
peted over by only a single organization (i.e., exclusive nichers), this is at least
partly an illusion. Exclusive nichers in our data are also being competed over
by the school itself and may well be experiencing competition from other
groups that are not captured in our data. Because all of our respondents are
part of the school context and we included niches for the three major non-
school adolescent organization types (i.e., religious organizations, formal em-
ployment, and gangs), this is unlikely to affect our results. However, use of the
method in other empirical cases would be aided by an improved understand-
ing ofwhen groups compete.Ourmodel also includes implications for the abil-
ity of contagions to diffuse through a population, but we were unable to test
them. Future research should explore whether the diffusion of social conta-
gions is impeded by niche overlap, as we suggest. We ﬁnd that the behaviors
characteristic of an organization are able to inﬂuence nonmembers, but it is
probably not the case that all observable organizational behaviors are prone
to spread beyond the organization’s borders. Future research should identify
the attributes of those behaviors most likely to spread. Finally, while beyond
the scope of this article, it would be interesting to attempt to link our approach
to othermethods for capturing casual contacts. For example, researchers could
examine whether proximity in Blau space is associated with sharing the same
Organizational Leakage
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local position (Field et al. 2006; Frank et al. 2008), aswell as how local positions
and Blau space proximity interact to produce social networks.
Much work remains to be done, but these results are promising. Our the-
ory and ﬁndings have important implications for organizational theory, dif-
fusion, the study of culture, and social psychology. Moreover, this article
supports the classic sociological insight that organizations are social entities
that can have an effect on the world around them at multiple levels of anal-
ysis. It appears that when modeling individual behavior, we should attend
not only to the characteristics of the individuals but also to the entities that
compete for their allegiance.
APPENDIX
Exponential Random Graph Models of Blau Dimensions
Analytic Strategy
We used exponential random graph models (ERGM; see Lusher et al. 2013)
to examine whether the adolescents in our data tend to associate with those
like themselves on each of our Blau dimensions, while controlling for soci-
ality (main) effects, demographic variables, organizational comembership,
and endogenous network effects.
In the ERGM framework the attribute effects belong to one of two types.
First, the modeling of the overall effect of an attribute (e.g., are females more
likely to form ties than males?), sometimes referred to as “sociality” (Good-
reau, Kitts, andMorris 2009), is measured at the individual level. The second
type of effect is measured at the dyadic level and captures how the sharing
of an attribute by the two members of a dyad affects the likelihood that they
will forma tie (e.g., are pairs of nodes that share a gender categorymore likely
to form a tie?). This dyadic attribute effect is used to investigate homophily/
heterophily. The two effects function akin to main effects and interaction ef-
fects, respectively, and both types of effects should be included in the model
if one is investigating a given attribute (Goodreau et al. 2009; Lusher et al.
2013).
Moreover, when modeling the effect of an exogenous attribute on tie for-
mation, it is important to demonstrate that the outcome is robust to effects
that are endogenous to the network itself. Endogenous mechanisms include
triadic and higher-order or structural effects, which capture well-established
(or newly theorized) mechanisms of tie formation such as preferential attach-
ment (Goodreau et al. 2009; Lusher et al. 2013).
We performed our ERGM analyses using the two largest schools in the
Add Health, which we pseudonymously refer to as WilliamMcKinley High
School (models 1a–4a) andNewUtrechtHigh School (models 1b–4b). Focus-
ing on these two schools is common (Bearman et al. 2004; Haas and Schaefer
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2014; Zhang et al. 2015) in network analysis of Add Health as these larger
schools provide sufﬁcient statistical power to test a variety of complex effects.
In addition, the schools represent two different social contexts: McKinley is
located in a midsized town in theMidwest and is more than 90%white while
New Utrecht is located in a suburb of theWest and is ethnically and racially
diverse.
For each school we estimated four sets of nested models, which assess the
tendency to associate on the basis of Blau dimensions while controlling for
sociality effects (models 1a and 1b), demographic variables (models 2a and
2b), organizational comembership (models 3a and 3b), and structural effects
(models 4a and 4b). We have symmetrized the networks, as is relatively
common in the analysis of Add Health data (Goodreau et al. 2009; Schaefer
et al. 2011).33 Missing attribute data were imputed using the multivariate
imputation by the chained equations procedure (Raghunathan et al. 2001;
Buuren 2007).34 All models converged, and diagnostic tests showed they
were not degenerate.
Variables and Measurement
Homophily for continuous variables is measured as the absolute difference
in values between two actors making up the dyad. For example, the lower
the absolute difference on physical maturity between two actors, the more
likely they are to form a tie (i.e., a signiﬁcant and negative coefﬁcient indi-
cates the presence of homophily). We included all of the demographic var-
iables from our main models (i.e., race, gender, and age).
Organizational membership is modeled using a dyadic covariate rather
than absolute difference. Since our expectation is that sharing an organiza-
tional membership increases the likelihood of association, it would be inap-
propriate to model this in terms of absolute difference in number of organi-
zational memberships. In other words, our interest is to capture the effect of
sharing the same organizations, not the same number of organizations. We
therefore calculated the number of organizations shared by each dyad of the
network and used this matrix as a dyadic covariate (see Lusher et al. 2013,
chap. 8) in the model. In addition, we included amain effect variable for the
number of organizations a person belongs to, in order to control for themain
effect of overall organizational activity.
33 Analysis of unsymmetrized or directed data produces consistent results. However, the
diagnostics and goodness of ﬁt are better for the symmetrized data, and many other re-
searchers also symmetrize, so we present those models here.
34 The imputation generated ﬁve data sets, and the analysis was repeated on each one.
The results are consistent across each data set.
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We included two standard structural or endogenous network effects: tri-
adic closure and preferential attachment. Triadic closure refers to the ten-
dency to form a tie to the associate of an associate, creating a closed triangle
of relationships. For example,Marymight bemore likely to form a tie to Sue
if Mary and Sue both know Jon. One way to model triadic closure is to in-
clude triads as a predictor variable. However, because network data are by
their nature interdependent and the formation of one triad tends to increase
the creation of further triads, this simple triadic parameter tends to be un-
stable and leads to degeneracy (seeHunter 2007). To deal with this, onemay
use a geometrically weighted edge-wise degree distribution (GWESP) term,
which captures the distribution of the number of shared partners for each
tie in the network (Hunter, Goodreau, and Handcock 2008). The term en-
tails a decreasing marginal return for each extra shared partner a pair of
nodes have. To continue our example, the tie betweenMary and Sue ismore
likely if, besides Jon, they both know two, three, or perhaps four persons;
but each additional shared associate produces a diminishing return in asso-
ciation probability, and at some point additional shared associates make no
signiﬁcant difference to the likelihood of closure.35
Another important networkmechanism is preferential attachment, which
refers to the tendency to send ties to those who already have many ties in a
rich get richer or “Matthew” effect (Barabási and Albert 1999). This is mea-
suredusing the geometricallyweighted degree distribution (GWD) term,which
captures the distribution of degrees in the network. The more ties a person
has, the more likely she is to receive a tie. Like the GWESP parameter, the
GWD term attenuates the impact of each additional tie to deal with model
degeneracy (Hunter et al. 2008).
Results
The results are presented in table A1 for William McKinley High School
(WMHS) and table A2 for New Utrecht High School (NUHS). The coefﬁ-
cients of ERGM terms can be interpreted similarly to logistic regression.
They are expressed as odds ratios that indicate how a one-unit increase in
a predictor variable affects the odds of a tie.
The fourBlau dimensions are clear predictors of tie formation, controlling
for sociality, demographic variables, organizational comembership, and tri-
adic effects. While the homophily effect size of our dimensions diminishes
slightly as the controls are introduced, they remain signiﬁcant in both
35 Currently there is no principledway of identifying the exact value for the scaling param-
eter.We set theweighting parameter at 0.25 on the basis of two previousERGMstudies of
AddHealth data that used this parameter (Goodreau et al. 2009; Schaefer et al. 2011). The
GWESP parameter using this value performed well in diagnostics.
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schools. We can also see that, as expected by our theory, membership in the
same organization increases the likelihood of association and that this effect
remains when demographic similarities and higher-order network effects
are controlled for. Interestingly, we see that the main effect of the number
of organizational memberships is negative, suggesting that the more organi-
zations one belongs to, the fewer ties he or she will have overall. This makes
sense as one’s resources are consumedwith organizational duties. However,
it is countered by the robust effect of sharing organizational membership(s);
the more organizations two persons share, the more likely they are to form a
tie. In short, these results are consistent with our expectations and support
the validity of our primary analyses.
Blau dimensions such as income in both schools and PVT in NUHS ap-
pear to exert a main effect on tie formation. Gender also appears to exert a
TABLE A1
ERG Models of Tie Formation for William McKinley High School
MODEL 1a MODEL 2a MODEL 3a MODEL 4a
b SE b SE b SE b SE
Edges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24.83*** .31 23.11*** .51 22.83*** .51 25.10*** .11
Sociality:
Blau dimensions:
PVT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Maturity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .00 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .01
Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .00*** .00 .00*** .00 .00** .00 .00* .00
BMI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .00 .00 .01 .00 .01 .00 .01 .00
Demographic controls:
Gender (ref. 5 male) . . . . .06* .03 .05 .03 .05** .02
Race (ref. 5 nonwhite) . . . .20 .19 .21 .19 .18 .13
Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.04*** .01 2.05*** .01 2.02*** .01
Organization total . . . . . . . . 2.04*** .01 2.05*** .01
Homophily:
Blau dimensions:
PVT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.02*** .00 2.02*** .00 2.02*** .00 2.02*** .00
Maturity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.14*** .03 2.10*** .03 2.10*** .03 2.08** .02
Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.00*** .00 2.00*** .00 2.00*** .00 2.00** .00
BMI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.06*** .01 2.05*** .01 2.05*** .01 2.04*** .01
Demographic controls:
Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26*** .04 .22*** .04 .20*** .04
Race . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.16 .20 2.16 .20 2.16 .15
Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.71*** .02 2.69*** .02 2.51*** .02
Organization comembers . . . .66*** .03 .55*** .03
Triadic effects:
Triad closure (GWESP) . . . . 1.58*** .03
Preferential attachment
(GWD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.45*** .00
NOTE.—The high school names used are pseudonyms.
* P < .05.
** P < .01.
*** P < .001.
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main effect, with women having more ties than men overall in both schools
and whites tending to have more ties than nonwhites in NUHS, while youn-
ger students tend to havemore ties inWMHS. In addition to our Blau dimen-
sions, there appears to be homophily on gender and age in both schools, as
well as race in NUHS. Further, we see that structural mechanisms such as
triad closure andpreferential attachment exert strong effects on tie formation.
REFERENCES
Abbott, Andrew. 1988. “Transcending General Linear Reality.” Sociological Theory 6:
169–86.
———. 1997. “OfTime andSpace: TheContemporaryRelevance of theChicago School.”
Social Forces 75:1149–82.
TABLE A2
ERG Models of Tie Formation for New Utrecht High School
MODEL 1b MODEL 2b MODEL 3b MODEL 4b
b SE b SE b SE b SE
Edges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26.61*** .25 28.29*** .51 28.15*** .51 28.56*** .44
Sociality:
Blau dimensions:
PVT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .01*** .00 .01*** .00 .01*** .00 .00*** .00
Maturity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .01 .02 2.01 .02 2.01 .02 2.01 .01
Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .00*** .00 .00*** .00 .00** .00 .00** .00
BMI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Demographic controls:
Gender (ref. 5 male) . . . . .05* .02 .05* .02 .04* .02
Race (ref. 5 nonwhite) . . . .75*** .10 .75*** .10 .64*** .08
Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .02 .01 .02 .01 .01 .01
Organization total . . . . . . . . 2.04*** .01 2.04*** .01
Homophily:
Blau dimensions:
PVT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.02*** .00 2.02*** .00 2.02*** .00 2.01*** .00
Maturity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.06* .02 2.05* .02 2.05* .02 2.05* .02
Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.01*** .00 2.01*** .00 2.01*** .00 2.01*** .00
BMI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.04*** .01 2.04*** .01 2.04*** .01 2.04*** .01
Demographic controls:
Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46*** .04 .44*** .04 .39*** .03
Race . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.34*** .13 1.34*** .13 1.12*** .11
Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.66*** .03 2.66*** .03 2.56*** .02
Organization comembers . . . .51*** .03 .42*** .03
Triadic effects:
Triad closure (GWESP) . . . . 1.94*** .03
Preferential attachment
(GWD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.11*** .20
NOTE.—The high school names used are pseudonyms.
* P < .05.
** P < .01.
*** P < .001.
American Journal of Sociology
840
Albert, Stuart, and David A. Whetten. 1985. “Organizational Identity.” Research in Or-
ganizational Behavior 7:263–95.
Alexander, Norman, Jr., Lynne G. Zucker, and Charles L. Brody. 1970. “Experimental
Expectations and Autokinetic Experiences: Consistency Theories and Judgmental
Convergence.” Sociometry 33:108–22.
Aral, Sinan, and Marshall Van Alstyne. 2011. “The Diversity-Bandwidth Trade-off.”
American Journal of Sociology 117:90–171.
Argote, Linda, and Henrich R. Greve. 2007. “A Behavioral Theory of the Firm—40
Years and Counting: Introduction and Impact.” Organization Science 18:337–49.
Ashforth, Blake E., and FredMael. 1989. “Social Identity Theory and the Organization.”
Academy of Management Review 14:20–39.
Barabási, Albert-László, and Réka Albert. 1999. “Emergence of Scaling in RandomNet-
works.” Science 286:509–12.
Barash, Vladimir, Christopher Cameron, andMichael Macy. 2012. “Critical Phenomena
in Complex Contagions.” Social Networks 34:451–61.
Barber, Bonnie L., Jacquelynne S. Eccles, andMargaret R. Stone. 2001. “WhateverHap-
pened to the Jock, the Brain, and the Princess? Young Adult Pathways Linked to Ad-
olescent Activity Involvement and Social Identity.” Journal of Adolescent Research
16:429–55.
Barnes, J. C., KevinM. Beaver, Jacob T. N. Young, andMichael TenEyck. 2014. “ABe-
havior Genetic Analysis of the Tendency for Youth to Associate According to GPA.”
Social Networks 38:41–49.
Bearman, Peter, James Moody, and Katherine Stovel. 2004. “Chains of Affection: The
Structure of Adolescent Romantic and Sexual Networks.” American Journal of Soci-
ology 110:44–91.
Bewley, T. F. 1999.WhyWages Don’t Fall during a Recession. Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard University Press.
Blalock, Hubert M. 1984. “Contextual-Effects Models: Theoretical and Methodological
Issues.” Annual Review of Sociology 10:353–72.
Bond, Robert M., et al. 2012. “A 61-Million-Person Experiment in Social Inﬂuence and
Political Mobilization.” Nature 489:295–98.
Bonikowski, Bart. 2010. “Ecology of Taste: A Dynamic Analysis of Musical Genre Pref-
erences, 1982–2002.” Manuscript.
Borgonovi, Francesca. 2008. “Divided We Stand, United We Fall: Religious Pluralism,
Giving, and Volunteering.” American Sociological Review 73:105–28.
Brady, Henry E., Sidney Verba, andKay Lehman Schlozman. 1995. “Beyond SES: A Re-
sourceModel of Political Participation.”AmericanPolitical ScienceReview 89: 271–94.
Brand, Jennie E., and Yu Xie. 2010. “Who Beneﬁts Most from College? Evidence for
Negative Selection in Heterogeneous Economic Returns to Higher Education.” Amer-
ican Sociological Review 75:273–302.
Brashears,MatthewE. 2008a. “Gender andHomophily: Differences inMale and Female
Association in Blau Space.” Social Science Research 37:400–415.
———. 2008b. “Sex, Society, and Association: A Cross-National Examination of Status
Construction Theory.” Social Psychology Quarterly 71:72–85.
Brockner, Joel, and Walter C. Swap. 1976. “Effects of Repeated Exposure and Attitudi-
nal Similarity on Self-Disclosure and Interpersonal Attraction.” Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology 33:531–40.
Brown, B. Bradford, Sue Ann Eicher, and Sandra Petrie. 1986. “The Importance of Peer
Group (‘Crowd’) Afﬁliation in Adolescence.” Journal of Adolescence 9:73–96.
Brown, B. Bradford, andMary Jane Lohr. 1987. “Peer-Group Afﬁliation and Adolescent
Self-Esteem: An Integration of Ego-Identity and Symbolic-Interaction Theories.”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 52:47–55.
Burgess, Simon, Eleanor Sanderson, and Marcela Umana-Aponte. 2011. “School Ties:
An Analysis of Homophily in an Adolescent Friendship Network.” Working paper
Organizational Leakage
841
no. 11/267. Centre for Market and Public Organization, University of Bristol. http://
www.bristol.ac.uk/cmpo/publications/papers/2011/wp267.pdf.
Burt, Ronald S. 1980. “Innovation as a Structural Interest: Rethinking the Impact ofNet-
work Position on Innovation Adoption.” Social Networks 2:327–55.
———. 1991. “Measuring Age as a Structural Concept.” Social Networks 13:1–34.
Buuren, Stef van. 2007. “Multiple Imputation of Discrete and Continuous Data by Fully
Conditional Speciﬁcation.” Statistical Methods in Medical Research 16 (3): 219–42.
Centola, Damon. 2010. “The Spread of Behavior in an Online Social Network Experi-
ment.” Science 329:1194–97.
Centola, Damon, and Michael W. Macy. 2007. “Complex Contagions and the Weakness
of Long Ties.” American Journal of Sociology 113:702–34.
Chantala, Kim, andChirayathM. Suchindran. 2011. “AddHealthWeight Components.”
Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Christakis, Nicholas A., and James H. Fowler. 2007. “The Spread of Obesity in a Large
Social Network over 32 Years.” New England Journal of Medicine 357:370–79.
Cohen-Cole, Ethan, and Jason M. Fletcher. 2008a. “Detecting Implausible Social Net-
work Effects in Acne, Height, and Headaches: Longitudinal Analysis.” British Med-
ical Journal 337:a2533. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.a2533.
———. 2008b. “Is Obesity Contagious? Social Networks vs. Environmental Factors in
the Obesity Epidemic.” Journal of Health Economics 27:1382–87.
Coleman, James S. 1982. The Asymmetric Society. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University
Press.
———. 1986. “Social Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action.” American Jour-
nal of Sociology 91:1309–35.
———. 1990.Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press/Harvard
University Press.
Coleman, James S., Elihu Katz, and Herbert Menzel. 1966.Medical Innovation: A Dif-
fusion Study. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill (for Columbia University Bureau of Ap-
plied Social Research).
Conell, C., and S. Cohn. 1995. “Learning from Other People’s Actions: Environmental
Variation and Diffusion in French Coal Mining Strikes, 1890–1935.” American Jour-
nal of Sociology 101:366–403.
Crosnoe, Robert, Kenneth Frank, and Anna Strassmann Mueller. 2008. “Gender, Body
Size and Social Relations in American High Schools.” Social Forces 86:1189–1216.
Crosnoe, Robert, Catherine Riegle-Crumb, Sam Field, Kenneth Frank, and Chandra
Muller. 2008. “Peer GroupContexts of Girls’ and Boys’Academic Experiences.”Child
Development 79:139–55.
Dalton, Madeline A., James D. Sargent,Michael L. Beach, et al. 2003. “Effect of Viewing
Smoking in Movies on Adolescent Smoking: A Cohort Study.” Lancet 362:281–85.
Davis, G. F. 1991. “Agents without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill through the
Intercorporate Network.” Administrative Science Quarterly 36:583–613.
Dawkins, Richard. (1976) 2006.The SelﬁshGene, 30th anniversary ed.NewYork:Oxford
University Press.
Diaz, Juan Jose, and Sudhanshu Handa. 2006. “An Assessment of Propensity Score
Matching as a Nonexperimental Impact Estimator: Evidence from Mexico’s PRO-
GRESA Program.” Journal of Human Resources 41:319–45.
DiMaggio, Paul J., andWalter W. Powell. 1983. “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.” American Socio-
logical Review 48:147–60.
DiPrete, Thomas A., AndrewGelman, TylerMcCormick, Julien Teitler, andTian Zheng.
2011. “Segregation andSocialNetworksBased onAcquaintanceship andTrust.”Amer-
ican Journal of Sociology 116:1234–83.
Dornbusch, Sanford M., Kristan Glasgow Erickson, Jennifer Laird, and Carol A.
Wong. 2001. “The Relation of Family and School Attachment to Adolescent Devi-
American Journal of Sociology
842
ance in Diverse Groups and Communities.” Journal of Adolescent Research 16:396–
422.
Drapela, Laurie A., Janet L. Gebelt, and Nick McRee. 2006. “Pubertal Development,
Choice of Friends, and Smoking Initiation amongAdolescentMales.” Journal of Youth
and Adolescence 35:717–27.
Duncan, Alexis E., Arpana Agrawal, Julia D. Grant, Kathleen K. Bucholz, Pamela A. F.
Madden, and Andrew C. Heath. 2009. “Genetic and Environmental Contributions to
BMI in Adolescent and Young Adult Women.” Obesity 17:1040–43.
Durkheim, Emile. (1851) 1997. Suicide. New York: Free Press.
Eccles, Jacquelynne S., and Bonnie L. Barber. 1999. “Student Council, Volunteering,
Basketball, or Marching Band: What Kind of Extracurricular Involvement Matters?”
Journal of Adolescent Research 14:10–43.
Eder, Donna, and Stephen Parker. 1987. “The Cultural Production of Gender: The Ef-
fect of Extracurricular Activities on Peer-Group Culture.” Sociology of Education 60:
200–213.
Ellemers, Naomi, Russell Spears, and Bertjan Doosje. 2002. “Self and Social Identity.”
Annual Review of Psychology 53:161–86.
Erbring, Lutz, and Alice A. Young. 1979. “Individuals and Social Structure: Contex-
tual Effects as Endogenous Feedback.” SociologicalMethods andResearch 7:396–430.
Feld, Scott L. 1981. “The Focused Organization of Social Ties.” American Journal of So-
ciology 86:1015–35.
Feldman, Daniel C. 1984. “The Development and Enforcement of GroupNorms.”Acad-
emy of Management Review 9:47–53.
Festinger, Leon. 1954. “A Theory of Social Comparison Processes.” Human Relations 7:
117–40.
Field, Sam, Kenneth A. Frank, Kathryn Schiller, Catherine Riegle-Crumb, andChandra
Muller. 2006. “Identifying Positions fromAfﬁliation Networks: Preserving the Duality
of People and Events.” Social Networks 28:97–123.
Flache, Andreas, andMichaelW.Macy. 2011. “SmallWorlds andCultural Polarization.”
Journal of Mathematical Sociology 35:146–76.
Fowler, J. H., andN. A. Christakis. 2008. “TheDynamic Spread of Happiness in a Large
Social Network.” BMJ: British Medical Journal 337:a2338.
Frank, Kenneth A. 2009. “Quasi-Ties: Directions Resources toMembers of a Collective.”
American Behavioral Scientist 52:1613–45.
Frank, Kenneth A., ChandraMuller, and Anna S.Mueller. 2013. “The Embeddedness of
Adolescent Friendship Nominations: The Formation of Social Capital in Emergent
Network Structures.” American Journal of Sociology 119:216–53.
Frank, Kenneth A., Chandra Muller, Kathryn S. Schiller, et al. 2008. “The Social Dy-
namics of Mathematics Coursetaking in High School.” American Journal of Sociology
113:1645–96.
Friedkin, Noah E. 1983. “Horizons of Observability and Limits of Informal Control in
Organizations.” Social Forces 62:54–77.
———. 2001. “Norm Formation in Social Inﬂuence Networks.” Social Networks 23:
167–89.
Friedkin, Noah E., and Eugene C. Johnsen. 1997. “Social Positions in Inﬂuence Net-
works.” Social Networks 19:209–22.
———. 2011. Social Inﬂuence Network Theory: A Sociological Examination of Small
Group Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gamoran, Adam, and Robert D. Mare. 1989. “Secondary School Tracking and Educa-
tional Inequality: Compensation, Reinforcement, or Neutrality?” American Journal
of Sociology 94:1146–83.
Gardner, William, E. P. Mulvey, and C. E. Shaw. 1995. “Regression Analyses of Counts
and Rates: Poisson, Overdispersed Poisson, and Negative Binomial Models.” Psycho-
logical Bulletin 118:392–404.
Organizational Leakage
843
Gavetti, Giovanni, Daniel Levinthal, and William Ocasio. 2007. “Neo-Carnegie: The
Carnegie School’s Past, Present, andReconstructing for the Future.”Organization Sci-
ence 18:523–36.
Gilbert, Daniel T., R. Brian Giesler, and Kathryn A. Morris. 1995. “When Comparisons
Arise.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 69:227–36.
Gioia, Dennis A., and Peter P. Poole. 1984. “Scripts in Organizational Behavior.” Acad-
emy of Management Review 9:449–59.
Gioia, Dennis A., Kristin N. Price, Aimee L. Hamilton, and James B. Thomas. 2010.
“Forging an Identity: An Insider-Outsider Study of Processes Involved in the Forma-
tion of Organizational Identity.” Administrative Science Quarterly 55:1–46.
Giordano, Peggy C. 2003. “Relationships in Adolescence.” Annual Review of Sociology
29:257–81.
Goethals, George R. 1986. “Social Comparison Theory: Psychology from the Lost and
Found.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 12:261–78.
Goodreau, Steven M., James A. Kitts, and Martina Morris. 2009. “Birds of a Feather, or
Friend of a Friend? Using Exponential Random GraphModels to Investigate Adoles-
cent Social Networks.” Demography 46 (1): 103–25.
Gove,Walter R., andRobertD. Crutchﬁeld. 1982. “TheFamily and Juvenile Delinquency.”
Sociological Quarterly 23:301–19.
Granovetter, Mark S. 1995. Getting a Job: A Study in Contacts and Careers, 2d ed. Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press.
Guo, Shenyang, andMarkW. Fraser. 2010. Propensity Score Analysis: Statistical Meth-
ods and Applications. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.
Haas, Steven A., and David R. Schaefer. 2014. “With a Little Help from My Friends?
Asymmetrical Social Inﬂuence on Adolescent Smoking Initiation and Cessation.”
Journal of Health and Social Behavior 55 (2): 126–43.
Hallinan, Maureen T., and Richard A. Williams. 1989. “Interracial Friendship Choices
in Secondary Schools.” American Sociological Review 54:67–78.
Hanks, Michael. 1981. “Youth, Voluntary Associations and Political Socialization.” So-
cial Forces 60:211–23.
Hannan,MichaelT.,GlennR.Carroll, andLaszlo Polos. 2003. “TheOrganizationalNiche.”
Sociological Theory 21:309–40.
Hannan, Michael T., and John Freeman. 1989. Organizational Ecology. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Harris, Kathleen M. 2009. “The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health
(Add Health), Waves I & II, 1994–1996; Wave III, 2001–2002; Wave IV, 2007–2009
[Machine-Readable Data File and Documentation].” Carolina Population Center,
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
Harrison, J. Richard, and Glenn R. Carroll. 2002. “The Dynamics of Cultural Inﬂuence
Networks.” Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory 8:5–30.
Hayea, Kayla de la, Garry Robbins, PhilipMohr, andCarleneWilson. 2011. “Homophily
and Contagion as Explanations for Weight Similarities among Adolescent Friends.”
Journal of Adolescent Health 49:421–27.
Haynie, Dana L. 2001. “Delinquent Peers Revisited: Does Network Structure Matter?”
American Journal of Sociology 106:1013–57.
Henry, Kimberly L., and David H. Huizinga. 2007. “School-Related Risk and Protective
Factors Associatedwith Truancy amongUrbanYouth Placed at Risk.” Journal of Pri-
mary Prevention 28:505–19.
Hogg, Michael A., and Deborah J. Terry. 2000. “Social Identity and Self-Categorization
Processes in Organizational Contexts.” Academy of Management Review 25:121–40.
Holden, R. T. 1986. “The Contagiousness of Aircraft Hijacking.” American Journal of
Sociology 91:874–904.
Hornsey, Matthew J. 2008. “Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory: A
Historical Review.” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 2:204–22.
American Journal of Sociology
844
Hunter, David R. 2007. “Curved Exponential Family Models for Social Networks.” So-
cial Networks 29 (2): 216–30.
Hunter, David R., Steven M. Goodreau, andMark S. Handcock. 2008. “Goodness of Fit
of Social Network Model.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 103 (481):
248–58.
Ibarra, Herminia. 1995. “Race, Opportunity, and Diversity of Social Circles in Manage-
rial Networks.” Academy of Management Journal 38:673–703.
Ingram, Paul, and Peter W. Roberts. 2000. “Friendship among Competitors in the Syd-
ney Hotel Industry.” American Journal of Sociology 106:387–423.
Johnson, Cathryn, Timothy J. Dowd, and Cecilia L. Ridgeway. 2006. “Legitimacy as a
Social Process.” Annual Review of Sociology 32:53–78.
Jussim, Lee, and Wayne D. Osgood. 1989. “Inﬂuence and Similarity among Friends: An
Integrative Model Applied to Incarcerated Adolescents.” Social Psychology Quarterly
52:98–112.
Kelley, Jonathon, and Nan Dirk De Graaf. 1997. “National Context, Parental Socializa-
tion, and Religious Belief: Results from 15 Nations.” American Sociological Review
62:639–59.
Kilduff, Gavin J., HillaryAnger Elfenbein, andBarryM. Staw. 2010. “ThePsychology of
Rivalry: A Relationally Dependent Analysis of Competition.” Academy ofManagement
Journal 53:943–69.
Killworth, Peter D., Eugene C. Johnsen, H. Russell Bernard, Gene Ann Shelley, and
Christopher McCarty. 1990. “Estimating the Size of Personal Networks.” Social Net-
works 12:289–312.
King, BraydenG., Teppo Felin, andDavid A.Whetten. 2010. “Finding the Organization
in Organizational Theory: A Meta-Theory of the Organization as a Social Actor.” Or-
ganization Science 21:290–305.
Kirke, Deirdre M. 2004. “Chain Reactions in Adolescents’ Cigarette, Alcohol and Drug
Use: Similarity through Peer Inﬂuence or the Patterning of Ties in Peer Networks?”
Social Networks 26:3–28.
Kitts, James A. 2006. “Collective Action, Rival Incentives, and the Emergence of Antiso-
cial Norms.” American Sociological Review 71:235–59.
Klein,WilliamM. 1997. “Objective Standards AreNot Enough: Affective, Self-Evaluative
and Behavioral Responses to Social Comparison Information.” Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology 72:763–74.
Kohn, Melvin L., and Carmi Schooler. 1978. “The Reciprocal Effect of the Substantive
Complexity of Work and Intellectual Flexibility: A Longitudinal Assessment.” Amer-
ican Journal of Sociology 84:24–52.
———. 1982. “Job Conditions and Personality: A Longitudinal Assessment of Their Re-
ciprocal Effects.” American Journal of Sociology 87:1257–86.
Ku, Gillian, Deepak Malhotra, and J. Keith Murninghan. 2005. “Towards a Com-
petitive Arousal Model of Decision-Making: A Study of Auction Fever in Live and
Internet Auctions.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 96:89–
103.
Kubitschek, Warren N., and Maureen T. Hallinan. 1998. “Tracking and Students’
Friendships.” Social Psychology Quarterly 61:1–15.
Laumann, Edward O. 1965. “Subjective Social Distance and Urban Occupational Strat-
iﬁcation.” American Journal of Sociology 71:26–36.
———. 1966.Prestige andAssociation in anUrbanCommunity: An Analysis of anUrban
Stratiﬁcation System. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
Lazarsfeld, Paul F., and Robert K.Merton. 1954. “Friendship as a Social Process: A Sub-
stantive and Methodological Analysis.” Freedom and Control in Modern Society 18:
18–66.
Levins, Richard. 1968. Evolution in Changing Environments: Some Theoretical Explo-
rations. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Organizational Leakage
845
Lewis, Kevin,Marco Gonzalez, and JasonKaufman. 2012. “Social Selection and Peer In-
ﬂuence in an Online Social Network.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sci-
ences USA 109:68–72.
Lim, Chaeyoon, and Carol Ann MacGregor. 2012. “Religion and Volunteering in Con-
text: Disentangling the Contextual Effects of Religion on Voluntary Behavior.” Amer-
ican Sociological Review 77:747–79.
Lundquist, Jennifer Hickes. 2004. “When Race Makes No Difference: Marriage and the
Military.” Social Forces 83:731–57.
Lusher, Dean, Johan Koskinen, and Garry Robins. 2013. Exponential Random Graph
Models for Social Networks: Theory, Methods, and Applications. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Marin, Alexandra. 2012. “Don’t Mention It: Why People Don’t Share Job Information,
When They Do, and Why It Matters.” Social Networks 34:181–92.
Mark, Noah. 1998. “Birds of a Feather Sing Together.” Social Forces 77:453–85.
———. 2003. “Culture and Competition: Homophily and Distancing Explanations for
Cultural Niches.” American Sociological Review 68:319–45.
Marsden, Peter V. 1981. “Introducing Inﬂuence Processes into a System of Collective De-
cisions.” American Journal of Sociology 86:1203–35.
———. 1987. “Core Discussion Networks of Americans.” American Sociological Review
52:122–31.
———. 1988. “Homogeneity in Conﬁding Relations.” Social Networks 10:57–76.
Marsden, Peter V., and Noah E. Friedkin. 1993. “Network Studies of Social Inﬂuence.”
Sociological Methods and Research 22:127–51.
Marsden, Peter V., andE.H. Gorman. 2001. “SocialNetworks, JobChanges andRecruit-
ment.” Pp. 503–30 in Sourcebook of LaborMarkets: Evolving Structures and Processes,
edited by I. E. Berg and A. L. Kallenberg. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum.
Matsueda, Ross L., and Kathleen Anderson. 1998. “The Dynamics of Delinquent Peers
and Delinquent Behavior.” Criminology 36:269–308.
McCarty, Christopher, Peter D. Killworth, H. Russell Bernard, Eugene C. Johnsen, and
Gene A. Shelley. 2001. “Comparing TwoMethods for Estimating Network Size.” Hu-
man Organization 60:28–39.
McCarty, Christopher, Peter D.Killworth, and James Rennell. 2007. “Impact ofMethods
for Reducing Respondent Burden on Personal Network Structural Measures.” Social
Networks 29:300–315.
McFarland, Daniel A., and Reuben J. Thomas. 2006. “Bowling Young: HowYouth Vol-
untary Associations Inﬂuence Adult Political Participation.” American Sociological
Review 71:401–25.
McPherson, J. Miller. 1983. “An Ecology of Afﬁliation.” American Sociological Review
48:519–32.
———. 2004. “ABlau Space Primer: Prolegomenon to an Ecology of Afﬁliation.” Indus-
trial and Corporate Change 13:263–80.
McPherson, J.Miller, and James R. Ranger-Moore. 1991. “Evolution on a Dancing Land-
scape: Organizations and Networks in Dynamic Blau Space.” Social Forces 70:19–42.
McPherson, J. Miller, and Thomas Rotolo. 1996. “Testing a Dynamic Model of Social
Composition: Diversity and Change in Voluntary Groups.”American Sociological Re-
view 61:179–202.
McPherson, J. Miller, and Lynn Smith-Lovin. 1987. “Homophily in Voluntary Organi-
zations: Status Distance and the Composition of Face-to-Face Groups.” American So-
ciological Review 52:370–79.
———. 1988. “AComparative Ecology of FiveNations: Testing aModel of Competition
among Voluntary Organizations.” Chap. 6 in Ecological Models of Organizations, ed-
ited by Glenn R. Carroll. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger.
McPherson, J. Miller, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and JamesM. Cook. 2001. “Birds of a Feather:
Homophily in Social Networks.” Annual Review of Sociology 27:415–44.
American Journal of Sociology
846
Mercken, L., T. A. B. Snijders, C. Steglich, E. Vartiainen, and H. de Vries. 2010. “Dy-
namics of Adolescent FriendshipNetworks and SmokingBehaviors.”Social Networks
32:72–81.
Moreland, Richard L., and Robert B. Zajonc. 1982. “Exposure Effects in Personal Per-
ception: Familiarity, Similarity, and Attraction.” Journal of Experimental Social Psy-
chology 18:395–415.
Morgan, Stephen L., and Jennifer J. Todd. 2008. “A Diagnostic Routine for the Detec-
tion of Consequential Heterogeneity of Causal Effects.” Sociological Methodology 38:
231–81.
Morgan, Stephen L., and Christopher Winship. 2007. Counterfactuals and Causal Infer-
ence: Methods and Principles for Social Research. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Muller, Chandra, Jennifer Pearson, Catherine Riegle-Crumb, et al. 2007. “National Lon-
gitudinal Study of Adolescent Health Wave III Education Data Academic Networks
Codebook.” Chapel Hill, N.C.: Carolina Population Center. http://www.laits.utexas
.edu/ahaa/docs/AcdmcNtwrks_2007.pdf.
Mussweiler, Thomas, and Katja Ruter. 2003. “What Friends Are For! The Use of Rou-
tine Standards in Social Comparison.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
85:467–81.
Nathan, Anil Sathia. 2008. “Friendship Patterns in Schools: An Analysis Using the Na-
tional Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health.” Ph.D. dissertation. Duke University,
Department of Economics.
Newman, Mark, Albert-Laszló Barabási, and Duncan J.Watts. 2006. The Structure and
Dynamics of Networks. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Newman, Philip R., and Barbara M. Newman. 1976. “Early Adolescence and Its Con-
ﬂict: Group Identity versus Alienation.” Adolescence 42:261–74.
Ouchi,WilliamG., andAlan L.Wilkins. 1985. “Organizational Culture.”Annual Review
of Sociology 11:457–83.
Peli, Gabor, and Jeroen Bruggeman. 2006. “Networks Embedded in n-Dimensional
Space: The Impact of Dimensionality Change.” Social Networks 28:449–53.
Perrow, Charles B. 1979. Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay. Glenview, Ill. Scott,
Foresman.
———. 2002.Organizing America: Wealth, Power, and the Origins of Corporate Capital-
ism. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Popielarz, Pamela A., andMiller J.McPherson. 1995. “On the Edge or in Between: Niche
Position, Niche Overlap, and the Duration of Voluntary Association Memberships.”
American Journal of Sociology 101:698–720.
Raghunathan, Trivellore E., James M. Lepkowski, John Van Hoewyk, and Peter
Solenberger. 2001. “A Multivariate Technique for Multiply Imputing Missing Values
Using a Sequence of Regression Models.” Survey Methodology 27 (1): 85–96.
Richardson, HelenM. 1940. “Community of Values as a Factor in Friendships of College
and Adult Women.” Journal of Social Psychology 11:303–12.
Roberts, Sam G. B., Ruth Wilson, Pawel Fedurek, and R. I. M. Dunbar. 2008. “Individ-
ual Differences and Personal Network Size and Structure.” Personality and Individ-
ual Differences 44:954–64.
Rogers, Everett M. 2003. Diffusion of Innovations, 5th ed. New York: Free Press.
Rosenbaum, Paul R., and Donald R. Rubin. 1983. “The Central Role of the Propensity
Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects.” Biometrika 70:41–55.
Rotchford, Nancy L., and Karlene H. Roberts. 1982. “Part-Time Workers as Missing
Persons in Organizational Research.” Academy of Management Review 7:228–34.
Rubin, Donald B. 2006. Matched Sampling for Causal Effects. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Ruiter, Stijn, and Nan Dirk De Graaf. 2006. “National Context, Religiosity, and Volun-
teering: Results from 53 Countries.” American Sociological Review 71:191–210.
Organizational Leakage
847
———. 2010. “National Religious Context and Volunteering: More Rigorous Tests Sup-
porting the Association.” American Sociological Review 75:179–84.
Saegert, Susan,Walter Swap, and R. B. Zajonc. 1973. “Exposure, Context, and Interper-
sonal Attraction.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 25:234–42.
Sargent, James D. 2005. “Smoking in Movies: Impact on Adolescent Smoking.” Adoles-
cent Medicine Clinics 16:345–70.
Schaefer, David R., Olga Kornienko, and AndrewM. Fox. 2011. “Misery Does Not Love
Company: Network Selection Mechanisms and Depression Homophily.” American
Sociological Review 76:764–85.
Schaefer, DavidR., SandraD. Simpkins, AndreaE. Vest, andCharaD. Price. 2011. “The
Contribution of Extracurricular Activities to Adolescent Friendships: New Insights
through Social Network Analysis.” Developmental Psychology 47:1141–52.
Scott, W. Richard. 2004. “Reﬂections on a Half-Century of Organizational Sociology.”
Annual Review of Sociology 30:1–21.
Scott, W. Richard, and JohnW.Meyer. 1994. Institutional Environments and Organiza-
tions: Structural Complexity and Individualism. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.
Shi, Yongren, Fedor A. Dokshin, Michael Genkin, and Matthew E. Brashears. 2017. “A
Member Saved Is a Member Earned? The Recruitment-Retention Trade-off and Or-
ganizational Strategies for Membership Growth.” American Sociological Review 82:
407–34.
Simpkins, SandraD., David R. Schaefer, CharaD. Price, andAndrea E. Vest. 2012. “Ad-
olescent Friendships, BMI, and Physical Activity: Untangling Selection and Inﬂuence
through Longitudinal Social Network Analysis.” Journal of Research on Adolescence
23:537–49.
Smith, Jeffrey A., Miller McPherson, and Lynn Smith-Lovin. 2014. “Social Distance in
the United States: Sex, Race, Religion, Age, and Education.” American Sociological
Review 79:432–56.
Stattin, Hakan, and David Magnusson. 1990. Pubertal Maturation in Female Develop-
ment. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Strang, David, and Sarah A. Soule. 1998. “Diffusion in Organizations and Social Move-
ments: From Hybrid Corn to Poison Pills.” Annual Review of Sociology 24:265–90.
Suchman,Mark C. 1995. “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches.”
Academy of Management Review 20:571–610.
Sun, Lijun, KayW. Axhausen, Der-Horng Lee, andXienfengHuan. 2013. “Understand-
ingMetropolitan Patterns of Daily Encounters.”Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences USA 110:13774–79.
Swap, Walter C. 1977. “Interpersonal Attraction and Repeated Exposure to Rewarders
and Punishers.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 3:248–51.
Tajfel, Henri. 1982. “Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations.” Annual Review of Psy-
chology 33:1–39.
Trinitapoli, Jenny, and Stephen Vaisey. 2009. “The Transformative Role of Religious
Experience: The Case of Short-Term Missions.” Social Forces 88:121–46.
Useem, M. 1984. The Inner Circle. New York: Oxford University Press.
Uzzi, Brian. 1997. “Social Structure and Competition in Interﬁrm Networks: The Para-
dox of Embeddedness.” Administrative Science Quarterly 42:35–67.
Uzzi, Brian, and Ryon Lancaster. 2003. “Relational Embeddedness and Learning: The
Case of Bank Loan Managers and Their Clients.” Management Science 49:383–99.
Van den Bulte, Christophe, andGary L. Lilien. 2001. “Medical Innovation Revisited: So-
cial Contagion versusMarketing Effort.”American Journal of Sociology 106:1409–35.
Van derMeer, Tom,Manfred Te Grotenhuis, and Ben Pelzer. 2010. “Inﬂuential Cases in
Multilevel Modeling: A Methodological Comment.” American Sociological Review
75:173–78.
Walker, Henry A., GeorgeM. Thomas, andMorris Zelditch, Jr. 1986. “Legitimation, En-
dorsement, and Stability.” Social Forces 64:620–43.
American Journal of Sociology
848
Walker,HenryA., andMorris Zelditch, Jr. 1993. “Power, Legitimacy, and the Stability of
Authority: A Theoretical Research Program.” Pp. 364–84 in Theoretical Research Pro-
grams: Studies in the Growth of Theory, edited by J. Berger and Morris Zelditch, Jr.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
White, Harrison C., Scott A. Boorman, and Ronald L. Breiger. 1976. “Social Structure
from Multiple Networks. I. Blockmodels of Roles and Positions.” American Journal
of Sociology 81:730–80.
Wilson, Anne, and Michael Ross. 2000. “The Frequency of Temporal-Self and Social
Comparisons in People’s Personal Appraisals.” Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology 78:928–42.
Wilson, John, and Marc Musick. 1999. “The Effects of Volunteering on the Volunteer.”
Law and Contemporary Problems 62:141–68.
Zajonc, Robert B. 1968. “Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure.” Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology 9:1–27.
Zelditch,Morris, Jr., andHenryA.Walker. 2003. “TheLegitimacy of Regimes.”Advances
in Group Processes 20:217–49.
Zhang, J., L. Tong, P. J. Lamberson, R. A. Durazo-Arvizu, A. Luke, and D. A. Shoham.
2015. “Leveraging Social Inﬂuence to Address Overweight and Obesity Using Agent-
BasedModels: TheRole of Adolescent Social Networks.”Social Science andMedicine
125:203–13.
Zucker, Lynne G. 1977. “The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence.” Amer-
ican Sociological Review 42:726–43.
Organizational Leakage
849
